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Over the past twenty-seven years, Cuba has transformed
its military forces from an ill-equipped, untrained band of
guerrillas into the second most powerful military in the
Caribbean Basin. Today, the Cuban armed forces are equipped
with numerous modern fighter-bomber aircraft, warships
(including attack submarines) , tanks, and other lethal
weaponry. Unlike other recipients of Soviet arms, Cuba has
proven its capability and willingness to maintain and
operate this sophisticated military equipment around the
world, even in combat environments. This has been demon-
strated in Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.
Havana has also developed an extensive intelligence and
propaganda apparatus capable of performing tasks ranging
from espionage and disinformation to assassination and arms
smuggling.
Cuba's growing military, paramilitary, and intelligence
presence in the Caribbean Basin, combined with the expanding
military power of the Soviet Union and Soviet-backed
Nicaragua in the same region, pose a serious and growing
threat to U.S. security interests in the Caribbean and
elsewhere in the Third World.
This thesis will examine specifically Cuba's capability
and intent to jeopardize United States' security interests
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I. INTRODUCTION
The armed forces of the socialist states . . . (are)
trained to . . . give fraternal assistance to peoples who
are fighting for liberation from class and national
oppression. [Ref. l:p. 220]
The above quote by Marshall Sokolovskiy in 1968 indi-
cates the Soviet Union has long understood the value and
validity of using the armed forces of its allies to further
its own foreign policy objectives. There are, however, few
examples of the Soviets receiving substantial military sup-
port from its allies in endeavors outside of the geographic
zone of the Warsaw Pact.
The major exception is Cuba. This impoverished Carib-
bean nation of only ten million people has been at the fore-
front of military interventions throughout the Third World.
Cuban combat troops and military advisors have been deployed
in large numbers to Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Syria, the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) , and most
recently Grenada and Nicaragua. Smaller military training
groups from Cuba have served in numerous countries in
Africa, the Middle East, Asia and in the Western Hemisphere.
During the Falkland Island's conflict between Argentina and
Great Britain, Castro even offered to send Cuban combat
personnel to assist Buenos Aire's right-wing military
government in resisting Great Britain's counterattack.
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Cuba's assistance to nations it finds ideologically
worthy is not limited to the field of military training and
combat support. Many of Cuba's overseas programs deal with
development programs in the Third World. Since the early
1960s, Cuba has been active sponsoring economic and health
care programs in select countries in Africa, the Middle East
and Latin America. Yet, these programs are severely limited
by Cuba's meager resources and continued reliance on massive
aid from the Soviet Union for economic survival.
It is in the areas of military and security assistance,
in cooperation with the Soviets, that Cuban foreign policy
has had its greatest impact on the Third World and has most
successfully challenged Western interests. Cuba's foreign
military actions in the Third World over the past quarter-
century have dwarfed the combined efforts of all other
Warsaw pact nations, and at times have rivaled the Soviets
themselves in the number of men committed in overseas
military interventions and missions.
Since capability and intent are the two most important
variables in assessing the threat potential of any given
nation, this study will examine Cuba's ability and inclina-
tion to pose a strategic and regional military threat to the
United States, NATO and Third World nations aligned with the
West.
This analysis of Cuba's power projection capability will
examine the motives, resources and tactics used by the Cuban
12
regime against Western security interests. Following an
analysis of Cuba's ability and motivation to jeopardize U.S.
security, I will assess the Cuban threat and discuss pros-
pects for future Cuban military, para-military, or diplo-
matic interventions in the Third World, and specifically the
Caribbean Basin.
A problem inherent in analyzing the threat potential of
Cuba is separating Soviet motives, resources, and actions
from those of the Havana leadership. Since Cuba is exten-
sively dependent on the Soviet Union for economic, military,
and security assistance, it is difficult to determine what
constitutes the Cuban threat without active Soviet support.
This study will try to concentrate on Cuban motives,
resources and tactics while recognizing the crucial role
Moscow plays in permitting Havana to conduct its activist
foreign policy. Due to space restrictions, the Soviet
threat to United States' and NATO's security in the Western
Hemisphere will only briefly be covered in this paper.
Before proceeding, important concepts such as the Cuban
Interventionary Forces, power projection capability, and the
difference between a Soviet client and surrogate must be
defined. In this thesis, I shall use the term intervention-
ary forces to describe those forces in the Cuban military,
security services or government bureaucracy which are
designed primarily for military, paramilitary, or intelli-
gence operations overseas. Some of these agencies have a
13
dual ro;h allows them to be highly active in foreign
operaticaddition to their internal security duties in
Cuba.
By 1 intervention, I mean Cuba's capability and
willingias a sovereign nation, to influence events
abroad \ military, economic or political pressure. In
the casdba, these interventions usually take place in
the Thi]d, although Castro's intelligence network also
operatesstern Europe and Japan. Havana's interven-
tions a directly related to Cuba's physical security
because ake place in areas outside of Cuba's geograph-
ic bouni airspace, or territorial waters (12 nautical
miles o;) . Since Cuba is an island without contiguous
borders any other nation, foreign intervention cannot
be mistith common border disputes.
Thif will refer to Cuba as a Soviet surrogate in
the sent Cuba performs certain military services in
the Thi.d that furthers Soviet foreign policy goals.
This do mean that Havana is merely taking orders from
Moscow. e will see in later chapters, Havana's rela-
tionshi] its superpower sponsor—the Soviet Union— is
quite c Each nation cooperates in order to achieve
its desoreign policy objectives. Yet, the Soviet-
Cuban a: is not a partnership of equals. The Soviet
Union hitained an upper hand in the relationship, and
has use)ower to force Havana into compliance with its
14
policies (especially through economic pressure) . Finally,
the terms client and surrogate state, when referring to
Cuba, should not be confused with the normative definitions
usually associated with these titles. The difference
between a Soviet client state and surrogate depends not only
on the degree of control exercised by the Soviet Union over
a particular nation, but also on the willingness of the
Soviet client to actively pursue high-risk military actions
which benefit Soviet foreign policy.
According to Rose Gottemoeller of the RAND Corporation,
(A) client state becomes a surrogate when it moves beyond
passive political and diplomatic support for the Soviet
Union to actively implementing Soviet policies in neigh-
boring countries or around the world. Although often most
influential on the regional level, such countries also
promote Soviet interests globally. [Ref. 2:p. 1]
As mentioned earlier, Cuba has been the most active
Soviet ally in the Third World, conducting military inter-
ventions beneficial to Soviet foreign policy that the
Soviets were apparently unwilling to perform themselves.
Because of the costly nature (in terms of Cuban casualties)
of these interventions, the Cubans do maintain a certain
amount of veto power over whether or not they will partici-
pate in any major military action. This action is initiated
by the Cuban leadership, heavily influenced by whether or
not a specific operation will further Cuban foreign policy
goals. Evidence will show that Havana's interests are the
catalyst for all of Cuba's large-scale interventions. Since
the Soviet Union's economic and military aid is crucial for
15
the success of significant Cuban military operation, it
also provides ^^ with veto power over Cuban-sponsored
interventions the Soviets consider not in Moscow's
interest. Yety Castro and the Cuban decision-making
apparatus can t 30,000 to 50,000 troops to fight in
Africa as it djthe 1970s.
Analysis oCuban and Grenadian government documents
captured on Griin October 1983 provides an interesting
insight into tnamic relationship between Havana and
Moscow. It apjthat the Cubans were given a major role
in building thadian revolution. Havana had managed to
convince the i. Union that Grenada was strategically
important, ande a worthy investment. Given Cuba's
limited econoiesources, it is likely that Moscow
financed the cction of the new international airport
in Grenada, wi; labor provided by Cuban workers. The
Cuban governmeied as a broker between the Grenadian
government ancthier communist and radical states;
Grenada has s military agreements with the Cubans,
Soviets, and Nloreans. These governments promised to
supply the Gr«regime with $37.8 million in military
equipment, witbupplies being routed through Cuba. One
secret agreemeled for the Cubans to provide Grenada
with 40 militlvisors— 27 on a permanent basis, the
others for sh«riods. The documents prove that the
Havana-Moscow inship, at least in terms of its Grenada
16
policy, was a well-coordinated effort in which the Cubans
played a major role in developing strategy and implementing
policy, while Soviet-bloc countries provided the necessary
economic and military resources. [Ref. 3: p. 6]
Cuba's commitment and leadership role in building and
protecting Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Caribbean Basin
was confirmed during the month of October 1983. In that
month, an internal power struggle caused the death of
Grenada's Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, most of his
cabinet, and scores of innocent civilians. When the United
States conducted a joint operation with other Caribbean
forces to restore order in Grenada, it was the Cuban forces
(approximately 700 men, most of them reservists) who offered
the strongest resistance. This was the first time that the
United States military had ever engaged Cuban forces in
combat. The tenacity of the Cuban resistance in the face of
a superior force surprised the American forces.
One outcome of the Grenada operation is that the United
States can no longer dismiss the Cuban military threat as
insignificant (if it ever did) . Given the fact that over
3,000 Cuban military personnel are believed to be operating
in Nicaragua, one can only imagine the difficulty United
States' forces would have in neutralizing that country if
the situation should demand it. The Cuban armed forces has
at its disposal hundreds of advanced combat aircraft and
helicopters, three attack submarines, two blue-water
17
frigates, two amphibious landing ships, dozens of smaller
missile and torpedo attack boats, mine-warfare ships (mine-
layers and mine-sweepers) , an impressive network of air-
defense radars and surface-to-air missiles, and 13 divisions
(some of which are tank or mechanized divisions) . These
numbers have been increasing in recent years. These forces,
operating from an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" straddling
the Caribbean's sea lanes, pose a serious challenge to the
United States' defense strategy.
Nor is the Cuban threat limited to the geographic boun-
daries of the Caribbean, Cuba and Nicaragua. Over the past
quarter-century, Castro has cultivated working relationships
with numerous radical regimes, guerrilla groups, and terror-
ist organizations throughout the world. This system of
revolutionary allies provides Cuba with material and
manpower resources far greater than those available in Cuba.
Another threat to Western security is Cuba's recent
cooperation with Latin American drug traffickers. In return
for protection and intelligence support, Cuba receives badly
needed hard currency, assistance with arms smuggling, and
the satisfaction of knowing that Havana is contributing to
the demise of Castro's number one enemy—the United States.
To facilitate all of these operations, Havana has
developed an elaborate intelligence and paramilitary network
throughout the Caribbean Basin, Europe, the Middle East,
18
Africa and, according to most accounts, within the United
States and Canada.
This thesis will attempt to detail the present and
potential threat posed to the United States and NATO
regional and strategic security interests by these Cuban
Interventionary Forces.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
A. THE EARLY YEARS (1959-1974)
Cuba's ability to conduct overseas military operations
has been demonstrated repeatedly over the past 27 years. In
the 1960s, Castro sponsored small guerrilla groups in Latin
America, in what became known as the foco theory. This
strategy emphasized rural-based insurgency supported by
peasants or the "foco." While the Cuban effort was
widespread, not one of these groups was successful. Castro
was forced to abandon these efforts after a decade of
failure, Soviet economic pressure as a result of Moscow's
reluctance to support Castro's revolutionary vision, and
almost complete diplomatic isolation in the Western
Hemisphere.
Having failed in its initial strategy in Latin America,
Havana directed its revolutionary energy toward Africa.
With decolonization underway, and anti-imperialism a major
theme throughout that continent, the Cubans found a more
receptive environment in which to carry out their revolu-
tionary struggle. The Cuban forces in Africa soon became
active in setting up military training camps for Soviet-
backed governments. Cuba's first permanent overseas
military mission was most likely established in Ghana in
1961 [Ref. 4:p. 14]. There, the Cubans built a small
20
gucrainjnstructed West African rebels
in La ta;ane Nkrumah, Ghana's leftist
les ousy a military coup [Ref. 4:p.
14jCubana similar guerrilla training
canwly iieria from 1962-1965, until a
courew tleader, Ben Bella. [Ref. 4:p.
14]
ionar; commitment of combat troops
ove.s to ;tober of 1963, when a border
disv^^een Ijeria broke into open warfare.
Cuby hadjr enroute to Algeria when the
figuptedrived in Algeria with a cargo
of iks aiechnicians. Two more Cuban
shiimilit a battalion of tank troops
arr:rtly ng with additional troops and
tecl: airlf Cubana Britannia airliners.
[Ret4]
was d military advisors when it
becarent itary equipment would be of
litte wib four hundred Cuban combat
pers) trans. However, the Cubans were
spar.ing llirectly when a ceasefire was
signhe en Despite the ceasefire, the
Cubas reifc.ria until the end of 1963,
trai; AlgCise and maintenance of the 4
tanks and other military equipment provided by Havana.
[Ref. 4:p. 15]
Although the Cuban arms transfer to Algeria was a small
scale operation, it demonstrated a certain degree of cooper-
ation and coordination between Moscow and Havana. It is
unlikely that Cuba would have transferred 4 tanks to
Algeria without assurances from Moscow that they would be
replaced. This is especially true considering the transfer
took place less than a year after the Cuban Missile Crisis,
when Cuba must have felt particularly vulnerable to an
attack from the United States. [Ref. 4:p. 16]
Cuban military involvement in Africa remained at a high
level throughout the 1960s, usually in the form of
supporting guerrilla groups and militia training programs
for friendly regimes. Che Guevara headed a number of Cuban
delegations to Africa to set up Cuban advisory missions in
Congo-Leopoldville (later Zaire) , Cong-Brazzaville, and
Algeria, in order to train guerrillas fighting the
Portuguese in Lisbon's remaining African colonies. In
Angola, the primary recipient of Cuban aid was the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola forces (MPLA) , in
Mozambique the Marxist FRELIMO movement, and the PAIGC move-
ment in Portuguese Guinea. [Ref. 4:p. 18]
By 1966, the Cubans became disillusioned with their
efforts to train African guerrillas. Unfavorable
conditions, including rebel corruption and cowardice, had
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soured Cuba's interest in active support. Obviously, the
objective conditions proved to be unsuited for the Castro-
Guevara type of revolutionary warfare. Understanding that
they would have" to wait for better conditions, the Cubans
turned their talents toward protecting "progressive"
regimes, such as in the Congo (Brazzaville) . In the Congo,
the Cubans served as the Presidential Guard for Congolese
President Massamba-Debat , and helped organize his militia.
The Cubans proved to be very successful in protecting their
African allies from military coups. Similar coups had
toppled two of their best friends in Africa: Ben Bella in
Algeria, and Nkrumah in Ghana, and the Cubans decided it was
necessary to protect their revolutionary gains before
promoting insurgencies elsewhere. Havana was well suited
for the bodyguard role. The Cuban experience of combating
counter-revolutionary movements at home taught the Castro
regime what was necessary to stay in power despite
widespread antipathy at home and abroad. Havana soon became
known in Africa as the supplier of the Praetorian guard for
friendly regimes, and concentrated on this type of military
training mission well into the 1970s. [Ref. 5:p. 209]
In the early 1970s, Cuban and Soviet power projection
interests converged in the Third World for the first time
since the Algerian action in 1963. Beginning with the Czech
arms deal to Gamal el-Nasser's Egypt in 1955, the Soviets
actively supplied arms and military assistance to the
23
frontline Arab states in their wars against Israel.
Initially, Cuba showed little interest in either the Arab-
Israeli conflict itself, or Soviet efforts to win Arab
support in that region of the world. In fact, Havana took
positions seemingly contrary to the Soviet position. For
example, the Soviets and Eastern Europeans severed
diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 Six-Day War.
In an act of defiance, Cuba waited until the 197 3 Non-
Aligned Conference in Algiers to break diplomatic relations
with the Jewish State. Castro changed his position as a
result of intense Soviet economic and Arab diplomatic
pressure. By 1973, Havana's economic independence from
Moscow was on the decline. Cuba became a permanent member
of the Soviet-Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
or CEMA in 1972, thus fusing the Cuban economy with that of
the Soviet Union and other members of the Eastern bloc. In
addition to pressure from Moscow, Castro (still interested
in becoming the leader of the Third World revolutionary
struggle) was repeatedly stung by Arab verbal attacks in the
Non-aligned Movement (NAM) . While some of the attacks ques-
tioned Cuba's independence from the Soviet Union, and its
right to continue to be a member of the NAM, the Arab states
were obviously more concerned about Havana's lack of
interest in the struggle against Israel. [Ref. 6:p. 157]
Following the 1973 NAM conference in Algiers, Havana soon
became a major champion of Arab causes in Third World
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forums. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Castro would be able
to prove Cuba's commitment to the Arab world by fighting
against Israel. Prior to taking on an experienced military
force such as the Israelis, Castro gained invaluable combat
experience for his troops in South Yemen.
South Yemen proved in 1972 to be the first example of
what Hosmer and Wolfe call "Cooperative Intervention" by
Soviet and Cuban military forces.^ The secretary-general of
the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen's (PDRY) ruling
party, Abd Al-Fattah Isma'il, visited Havana at Castro's
request in October of that year. It is believed that the
PDRY ' s leadership asked Castro to help the PDRY in assisting
the Dhofari rebels which were fighting in neighboring Oman.
Castro apparently agreed to help the PDRY, because Isma'il,
on his departure from Cuba, stated that "our revolution can
count on the firm support of the Cuban revolution." [Ref.
4:p. 27] Isma'il also criticized Soviet aid to the PDRY by
saying that Moscow's assistance compared unfavorably with
the "much more extensive" Cuban aid [Ref. 4:p. 27]
Despite Isma'il's criticism, the Soviets were heavily
involved in building the PDRY ' s military forces. Tons of
advanced military equipment arrived in South Yemen from the
^Hosmer and Wolfe first used this term to describe
Cuban-Soviet coordination in Angola in 1975-1976. It also
applies to the Syrian and PDRY interventions. See: Stephen
T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and Practice





Sovieiuring the previous six months. A major effort
was rto train the PDRY ' s military to operate and
maintSoviet equipment. Thus, by April of 1973, 200
Cubanry advisors arrived to provide guerrilla
trainoth the PDRY ' s army and the Dhofar guerrillas.
The Cso set up a popular militia, similar to the
milit had been so successful in training in Africa,
to pne PDRY's party leadership. [Ref. 4:p. 27]
Cubance personnel arrived two months later to train
Yemen and maintenance crews to fly and service the
Sovieipplied by Moscow. In addition, Cuban security
persos provided to the PDRY's government to set up
an imcurity apparatus. [Ref. 4: p. 27]
Citary assistance to the PDRY was tripled
folio Shah of Iran's intervention with 1200 airborne
troopialf of the government of Oman in late 1973
[Ref.;. During that augmentation of Cuban soldiers,
some 2re sent to Aden aboard the Cuban ship Vietnam
Heroi le transiting to Aden, the ship also brought
some )ops to Mogadishu, Somalia. This was the first
deplo Cuban military advisors to that strategic
count4:p. 27]. Back in South Yemen, Cuban military
perso. reported on the PDRY's Island of Perim, which
contrentrance of the Red Sea, in late 1974 [Ref.
6:p. he Cuban advisors in the PDRY numbered between
600-7 the spring of 1976, when it was reduced to
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200. The reasons for the reduction of Cuban military
personnel were probably linked to Havana's pressing commit-
ments in Angola, or possibly to the PDRY ' s decision to stop
supporting the Dhofar rebels in early 1976. [Ref. 7:p. 26]
Cuba again played a major military role in the Middle
East by supporting Syria during and shortly following the
1973 Yom Kippur War. Castro, under pressure from the Arab
members of the Non-Aligned Movement, realized that by
supplying combat personnel to Syria he would riot only quell
Arab criticism, but increase Cuba's statute in Moscow's eyes
and throughout the Third World. Havana's total contribution
to Syria consisted of between 500 to 700 tank troops.
Israeli estimates place the number of Cubans fighting with
the Syrians in the thousands, which amounted to two
brigades. This discrepancy is probably due to the small
size of Cuban armored brigades compared to Israeli, U.S., or
even Soviet armor brigades. The Cuban tank crews were moved
from Damascus to the Golan Heights after the October War.
There, the Cuban troops, untested in tank warfare, fought
with Syrian crews against the Israelis in the February-May
1974 "War of Attrition" on the Golan Heights. According to
Israeli sources, the Cubans lost 180 killed and 250 wounded,
where the Israelis lost 68 dead and 178 wounded. [Ref.
7:p. 37]
After the October War, Cuba also sent pilots and
technicians to Syria as advisors. The Cuban advisors
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assisted the Syrian Air Force in absorbing (incorporating
numerous and sophisticated military equipment) new MIGs and
other combat aircraft sent by the Soviets to replace the
Syrian war losses. This was the second time that Cuban
pilots had assisted an Arab country absorb complicated MIGs.
South Yemen, a few months earlier, was the first. [Ref. 8]
The Cuban forces remained in Syria until February 1975.
The majority of them were withdrawn following consultations
between Havana and Damascus in January 1975 [Ref. 9:p. 12].
There are two reasons why the Cuban forces were withdrawn.
First, their services were no longer required by the Syrian
military. The second reason was Havana's desire to have
these highly trained forces available for future service in
Africa.
In the Cuban deployments to Algeria (1963) , the PDRY
(1973-76), and Syria (1973-75), the Cuban military training
teams were almost identical in size. Each consisted of four
to five hundred troops with specialization in tank and
aircraft operation. A number of Cuban technicians were also
involved to maintain the Soviet equipment. The major
difference with the two latter deployments was that they
brought no major military equipment with them. This
suggests that the Soviet equipment had either already
arrived in country or was in the process of being delivered
by the Soviets.
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B. INTEOWER (1975-198 6)
)an ir Angola in 197 5 represented a
msase ii.rseas military commitment. As
merevioi supported the MPLA faction in
Ana 196:975 Angola was on the brink of
ci' A po, had developed after the quick
wilof t following the fall of the
Sal-atorfactions fought each other for
con the stinho Neto ' s Marxist MPLA,
Hoi rto' Slater Jonas Savimbi's UlIITA
fac\e Ar,r was fueled by ,an arms race
bet\ sovichina, with Holden Roberto's
FNL^g llsors and 450 tons of military
equi^rm of Zaire between June and
AugU74. ^as able to train and equip
thou; trotiinese ass stance. Reacting
to t,se o Soviets decided to resume
arms-s to^on in Oct:er of 1974, after
the > rescnal disp^s [Ref. 2;p. 13].
Soon let iaccumulaUn MPLA's stock-
piles-.o atiems cau by the largely
illitiLA gu
1^1975 dry advis began to arrive
in Ang^rain^es. Dur-.he same period,
the Sqecid^e, ^^ ^^ ^"^ quality,
arms % to ces. ^V summer, Angola
was involved in a full-scale civil war. Eventually, South
African forces, in an attempt to secure the Cunene River dam
that provides water and electricity for Namibia, and in an
attempt to influence the outcome of the Angolan Civil War
conducted a summer invasion of Angola from the south. [Ref.
2:p. 12]
With aid from China, Zaire and the United States, the
FNLA faction was able to move within 2 miles of Luanda, the
MPLA's last major stronghold. According to Hosmer and
Wolfe, the MPLA asked the Cubans for combat troops after a
similar request was refused by the Soviets. In the four
months between November 1975 and February 1976, Cuban troops
and Soviet equipment turned the tide of battle in the MPLA's
favor. [Ref. 2:p. 13]
The Cuba intervention was critical in preventing the
Marxists from losing the Civil War, but also displayed their
weakness when confronted by a trained adversary. In mid-
December, the Cubans lost a three-day battle to the South
Africans about 150 miles south of Luanda. According to
Hosmer and Wolfe, this defeat almost caused the Cubans to
withdraw from Angola [Ref. 2: p. 14]. In the end, the Cubans
were saved by political developments, rather than by their
military prowess. The United States Congress ended all U.S.
support for the FNLA. The South Africans and Chinese saw
this as a sign that they would have to match the MPLA
guerrillas, Cuban troops, and Soviet equipment by
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themselves, something that they were unable or unwilling to
do for an extended period of time. This development forced
the South African forces to withdraw from Angola in January
1976 [Ref. 2:p. 14]. Despite the difficulties encountered
by the Cuban units in fighting the formidable South African
forces, the Cubans displayed considerable resourcefulness in
transporting over 20,000 troops to Angola, albeit with
massive Soviet assistance. Havana's effort continued
uninterrupted until the MPLA was firmly in power by the
spring of 1976. [Ref. 10] Some of the external factors
which contributed to the Soviet-Cuban success in Angola
included both Chinese and U.S. decisions to stop aiding the
FNLA faction, and friendly African nations such as Algeria,
Mali and the Congo providing the Soviets and Cubans with
critical aircraft basing rights and other logistical support
[Ref. 2:p. 14].
In 1977, the Soviet-Cuban "cooperative intervention"
forces again were tested in a distant Third World conflict.
The Angola success emboldened Castro and the Soviets to
intervene on behalf of Ethiopia, which was being invaded by
another Soviet client state—Somalia. While the regional
conflict was difficult to explain in Marxist-Leninist terms,
Moscow saw it as an opportunity to increase their influence
in this strategic region at the expense of the United
States. The Kremlin originally hoped to act as a mediator
in the conflict, and thus maintain its basing rights in
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Somalia (elly the strategic naval base at Berbera)
while simuisly gaining access to important Ethiopian
facilities. Cuban decision to send thousands of combat
troops to t the Ethiopian forces was taken when the
Soviet-Cubancing act between the two nations failed.
As with tliola experience, the Soviets provided large
quantities rms that could not be absorbed into the
Ethiopian forces. Shortly before the Soviet-Cuban
interventie Ethiopian military was losing badly in the
war againsSomalis in the disputed Ogaden region. At
the time cconflict, the Somalian Army had one of the
largest iries of tanks, artillery, and armored
personnel rs in Africa. Ironically, this equipment
was supplithe Soviet Union, and it had emboldened the
Somalis tde the Ogaden region with its mechanized
forces. [L:pp. 61, 69]
On Oct9 , 1977, the Soviets ended their shipments
to the in'ent Somalian regime. Somalia responded by
expelling ind Soviet advisors. Many of these expelled
Cuban advtravelled directly to Addis Ababa to help
their newDian friends absorb the military equipment
arriving le Soviet Union. However, the aid mission
alone was icient to expel the Somali forces from the
Ogaden. hiopian armed forces fighting against the
Somalis iOgaden were described as "beleaguered and
semimutincnd Castro eventually had to send between
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12,000-18,000 combat troops to assist the Ethiopians in
evicting the Somali invaders. [Ref. 2:p. 18]
At first, Castro denied that the Cubans were involved in
much more than a training mission. In a speech given in
March of 1978, Castro described the Cuban involvement as the
following:
Initially we decided to send a few dozen, maybe a few
hundred advisors to teach the Ethiopians how to handle
Soviet weapons. ... If the Ethiopians had had a little
more time they would have learned how to handle all those
tanks, artillery pieces, and other modern weapons! We,
along with other Socialist countries, would have
contributed to training personnel. But the critical
situation created by the invasion in late November led the
Ethiopian government to make an urgent request that we
send tank, artillery and aviation specialists to help the
army to help the country, and did so . . . [Ref. 5:p.
228]
Only after the Somali invasion had been repulsed did
Castro publicly indicate the extent of the Cuban involve-
ment, including the combat use of Cuban pilots, artillery,
tanks, and motorized infantry units [Ref. 5:p. 228].
The Cuban troops did refrain from direct combat with the
Eritrean guerrillas fighting the Ethiopian government in the
northern part of the country, with the possible exception of
flying close air support missions [Ref. 2:p. 18]. The
Soviets, like the Addis Ababa government, must fear the
Eritrean insurgency as a serious threat to Ethiopia's
territorial integrity and would have supported a direct
Cuban combat role as a means of protecting their investment.
Castro's self-imposed restraint in not allowing the Cuban
forces to play a larger combat role in the civil war could
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welltrate Havana's independence from Moscow, and
Castsire not to be seen as a Soviet puppet in the
Thir
ig their military successes in Angola and
Ethi^ie Cubans continued to sharpen their skills by
supp:he Sandinistas in Nicaragua and aiding the new
Marxernment of Grenada in consolidating power. In
NicaCastro managed to unite the various Marxist-
Lenictions prior to the revolution. Cuba also
assi2 Sandinistas in building a broad-based alliance
in H, with non-Marxist sectors such as the business
comund anti-Somoza press, to toppled the Somoza
regice the Sandinistas achieved power, the Cubans
quiet military and security service advisors, over
3, ©(assist the Sandinistas in "consolidating" the
Revcand building a modern anned forces. Numerous
souE indicated an extensive Cuban military presence
(mai large quantities of Soviet-supplied arms) in
Nicall before the Contra insurgency became a serious
thrhe Sandinistas. [Ref. 12:pp. 9-20] Considering
theies of tanks, APCs, helicopters, transport air-
craartillery sent to the Sandinistas over the past
fiv and given Havana's past history of supporting
revry allies militarily, it is likely that the Cuban
forplaying a major role in Nicaragua's war against
thei and Costa Rican-based Contras.
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Events in Grenada proved to be more difficult to control
than Havana's efforts in Africa, the Middle East and
Nicaragua. Despite a last minute effort to salvage the New
Jewel Movement's revolutionary government, Cuba's presence
in that strategically located island involvement was
terminated by the joint U.S . -Caribbean nations' intervention
in 1983.
By the end of the 1970s Cuba had indeed become a major
world military power despite the fact that Cuba was smaller
in area and population than the state of Pennsylvania. To
date, the Cuban Armed Forces have engaged in seven major
military operations in countries thousands of miles from
Cuban bases. These operations are in addition to the
numerous military training teams Havana has dispatched to
Third World allies to assist them in absorbing Soviet
military hardware.
A quick comparison with Warsaw Pact countries clearly
demonstrates the size and scope of the Cuban effort in
furthering world socialism. Of all the nations in the
Soviet Bloc, Cuba has consistently been the most militarily
active in supporting Soviet efforts in the Third World.
Havana has sent more military advisors and combat troops
overseas than either East Germany or the Soviet Union (see
Tables 1, 2 and 3). For example, the Soviet's most suppor-
tive Warsaw Pact ally. East Germany, with a population of
over 16 million, has never exceeded 2,500 advisors overseas
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TABLE 1
CUBAN MILITARY FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD 1977-1936
COUNTRY
77-78 78-79 79-30 8U-31 81-82 3:-?3 83-8- 8--35 35-86
ANGOLA* 15.U00 :5.000 20.000 19. JOG 19.000 18.000 25.000 19,000 20.000
R K.N IS - R X
CONGO S R R - - '30 730 750 '50
ETHIOPIA R7 16.000 17.000 lo.300 14.000 13,000 1 1 . OOO 3.000 5.000
PDRY R R R - 750 800 3(iO 300 500
NICARACr* ... . 200 2.000 1.000 3.000 3.000
107AMBIUUK R R R - 500 '50 750 750 750
IKAQ . - - - . - - 2,000
LIBYA R - R . - - - 3.000
GRENADA _ _ - - 50 300 30 -
ALGERIA R-R --___




UGANDA R R- -- - - -.-
SOMALIA -- - .-
TOTALS 15,000 4 1.000 37,000 33.500 34.500 35.600 38.830 3I.S00 30.000
R = Reported Presence of Cuban Military Personnel.
*NOTE: The International Institute for Strategic Studies
showed between 15-20,000 Cuban military personnel in Angola
in 1976-77. In 1986, 6,000 Cuban civilians were also in
Angola in addition to the 20,000 combat troops.
Source: International Institute for Strategic















- Y R U
78-79 7y-80 30-81 81-32 82-83 83-8A 84-85 83-86
1,500 R 800 450 450 500 500
K R 25u 550 550 5 50
R I.JO 32 5 75 75 7=-,
K H Inn ion I'JO 100
- - loO IbO IbO IbO
-
1 . 600 -00 400 400 a 00
R R ZIO 2 50 250 2 50
- - 125 125 125 !25
K R 2 10 210 2 10 2 10
rofAi.s
^.^00 ' 2,500 2,270 2,320 2,37r) 3 70
R = R^Psence of East German Military Personnel
NOTE: the East German Armed Forces numbered
17 4 , 000 (-,Qj^g(3j--j_pt3j ^ The breakdown of forces was
Army: ^javy: 15,000; and Air Force 39,000.
S°^^.rnational Institute for Strategic























































80-31 91-a: 32-33 3 3-5- 5-Sf
3.00C 35.000 9 5.0 C ''' IC 5. 20c 115.fO
_ _
:'.2 2C . . 222 _ OJO




-.500 ..600 . . .- j 'J — . '^ ' - ,roc
1 .Z'Jij 1 .000 : !:-50 2 - 20 500
1.500 1.500 l.iOO 1 .500 • 000
50
iOO 300 300 300
1.000 I. 000 1.220 « , . J oOO
1.000 1 .750 1 .5 JO :.v:o ,-00
- - 500 - ^ - ,-v 500
200 200 2 00 2 00 200
_ _ _
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:.5oo :.5oo 2 500 -.000 ,500
_ 500 "500 5-<0 500
_ QOO 900
-.000 •i.500 5.000 -.300 ,500
200
_ 300 300 300 200
-00 200 200 - -
- 100 - - "
-.100 IL'I .750 11-. -00 1 J:.-00 ].. 310
NOTE: The International Institute for ic Studies
began reporting Soviet military forces an 1980-81.
IISS also considereci Soviet forces in Mc^s abroad.
This study will not include those forcesjolia which
numbered 75,000 from 1983-85.
** The number of Soviet military personi-uba varies
due to the number of civilian advisors ir^untry. in
1985-86, the International Institute forjic Studies
reported there were 8,700 Soviet persn Cuba (i
brigade of 2,800) plus 2,800 Soviet mi]^visors and
some 3,100 technicians.
Source: International Institute for c
Studies, The Military Balanr.986,
London (published annually)
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in any given year (see Table 2) . Even the Soviet Union,
with a population of over 260 million, has sent only 143,000
troops and advisors to areas outside of the Warsaw Pact,
with the number dropping to 32,000 if Afghanistan is
excluded (see Table 3) . Cuba, with a population of only 10
million, has sent as many as 41,000 troops and advisors
overseas, and has as many as 30,000 overseas as late as 1935
(see Table 1)
.
What motivates this small Third World nation to
undertake such risky and costly military operations? What
is the relationship between Cuba and the' Soviet- Union in
these "cooperative interventions?" How did Cuba's military
and intelligence organizations develop such a capability in
less than a decade? Most importantly, what future
operations are the Cubans capable and willing to perform in
furthering Soviet and Cuban foreign policy goals? The
following chapter on Cuban motives for conducting military
interventions will attempt to answer these questions.
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III. CUBAN MOTIVES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
Over the past quarter-century, Cuba has consistently
advocated a militant, "anti-imperialist" foreign policy in
the Third World. This policy has been successful in a few
countries, but has experienced many failures elsewhere in
the Third World, especially in the Western Hemisphere.
Despite the setbacks suffered by revolutionary Cuba in pur-
suit of this policy, Havana has yet to abandon its support
for armed struggle as a viable means of achieving power. In
terms of duration alone, Cuba's commitment to revolutionary
warfare is almost unsurpassed in the Third World. Castro's
revolutionary credentials, though tainted by increased
reliance on Moscow's aid and approval, still attract many
international revolutionaries in search of training, asylum
and assistance. Should any of these revolutionary forces
come to power, as in the case of the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua, Havana's support continues in the form of Cuban
soldiers acting as a modern Praetorian guard to protect the
fledgling Marxist regime from "counter-revolutionary
forces," and as military advisors to build up the host
nation's armed forces and security services.
The reasons that a small, impoverished island-nation
like Cuba conducts such an ambirious and aggressive foreign
policy are a mixture of domestic political imperatives and
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Cuba's special relationship with the Soviet Union as a
superclient and military surrogate. Cuba's motives and
willingness to commit its troops and resources to conflicts
not directly related to its security is rarely understood by
most Western scholars and policy-makers.
The three theories usually given to explain Cuba's
eagerness to engage in large military interventions are:
1) Cuba is an independent actor merely pursuing its own
foreign policy designs, with Soviet economic and mili-
tary assistance allowing them to have the freedom to
do so
;
2) The Cubans are Soviet mercenaries, reluctantly taking
orders from Moscow; and
3) The Cubans and Soviets are pursuing their objectives
simultaneously, with the Cubans providing manpower and
the Soviets paying the bills, but each with veto power
as to where the interventions may occur.
The third theory is the most widely accepted by Cuban
scholars. Edward Gonzalez from the RAND Corporation refers
to this relationship as Cuba's "Paladin" or "Hired Gun" role
[Ref. 13:pp. 145-167]. Independent of the Soviet-Cuban
relationship, Castro has many reasons to conduct an
aggressive and militant foreign policy, especially in areas
where it conflicts with the power and influence of the
United States. These domestic factors will be discussed




Western scholars of Cuban politics have discovered a
complex and dynamic relationship at work between Havana and
Moscow that permits each nation to pursue its own objectives
in the world arena with a minimal amount of friction [Ref.
14:pp. 64-68]. Obviously, Cuba is unable to perform large-
scale interventions in the Third World, as it did in. the
last decade, without Soviet economic and military support.
Yet Cuba is not simply following orders from the Soviets.
According to Gonzalez, Castro's foreign policy consists of
sets of minimum and maximum goals. The minimum goals
include: enhancing his power base within Cuba; assuring his
regime's security vis-a-vis the United States by political
and military means; increasing Cuba's limited autonomy
within the parameters of an economically dependent state;
and receiving sufficient economic aid to promote the
island's development. These minimum goals are understanda-
ble and differ very little with those of other nations in
Latin America and the Third World. [Ref. 15 :p. 168]
On the other hand, Gonzalez notes that Castro's
maximalist foreign policy objectives are not only offensive
and aggressive in nature, but also place Cuba and the United
States on a collision course in the Caribbean Basin.
Gonzalez claims that these Cuban maximalist objectives,
which have been well-articulated over the past decade by
various members of the Cuban leadership, are the following:
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- To promote if not lead the Third World struggle against
"imperialism" in order to erode the global power and
presence of the United States.
- To extend Cuba's own influence and presence first in
Africa, and then in the Caribbean and Central America,
through active diplomatic, political, technical and
military-security presence in these areas.
- To promote through armed struggle, coups, or other means
the rise of radical-Left or Marxist-Leninist regimes in
the Caribbean Basin that will form a core of revolution-
ary states closely allied to Cuba.
- To transform Cuba—militarily as well as politically
—
into a second-order power and world-class actor through
the acquisition of Soviet weapons and other collabora-
tive ties with the USSR, thereby off-setting the
island's small population of 10 million and its limited
economic development and lack of material resources.
[Ref. 15:p. 167]
Gonzalez believes that Cuba's maximum policy objectives
have tended to make for an interventionist imperative—now
codified in Cuba's 1976 constitution—since it occurs at the
expense of improved relations with the United States. [Ref.
15:p. 167]
The 1976 Cuban Constitution is a strong indication that
Cuba's revolutionary policy of the 1960s is alive and well.
it also illustrates the degree of influence exercised by
Fidel Castro's "megalomania" in Cuban ideology and foreign
policy. The 1976 Constitution states that Havana's foreign
policy goal is the elimination of all "imperialist" (i.e.,
U.S.) political, economic and cultural influence in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The Constitution specifically
mentions Cuba's commitment to "proletarian
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internationalism," support for "wars of national
liberation," and the building of world socialism.
^
The primary pillar of Cuba's foreign policy is "anti-
Americanism" for both ideological and practical reasons.
From the early days of the Cuban Revolution, the United
States has been a barrier to Castro's political ambitions in
the world. Castro has successfully used anti-Americanism to
stir up nationalist feelings in the Third World. He
exploits this anti-Americanism to further Cuban foreign
policy interests, sometimes at the expense of the Third
World nations' economic and political development. Anti-
Americanism also ser'/es to distract the Cuban population
from their own hardships. The regime constantly reminds the
Cuban people of the historical frustration caused by their
giant neighbor to the north, and the sacrifices made by past
Cuban patriots to free Cuba of American domination. This
legacy, therefore, justifies the sacrifices demanded by the
Cuban government of Cubans today, whether it be fev/er
consumer goods or dangerous military service abroad.
Besides Castro's personal vision of Cuba as the vanguard
of armed revolution in the world, there are bureaucratic
forces within Cuba which also support a foreign policy based
on armed interventions. These forces have gained influence
and momentum in the Cuban decision-making process as the
^For a complete translation of the 1976 Cuban Constitu-
tion see Lester A. Sobel (editor)
, Castro's Cuba in the
1970's
. Facts on File, New York, 1978, pp. 167-185.
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Q-Qj-jation ;re institutionalized. Since the
earl whe;titutionalization process gained
mome^s® jactions have become the dominant
poijrces .ban hierarchy. The three groups
vie-^^ Pi^*^ '^'^^ limited resources of the
Cubc^ei^t.z describes the three factions as
thestas/.as, " and "pragmatists. " [Ref.
14 :i]
listal followers of Fidel Castro, some
of te bee early days of the guerrilla
str^instLsta dictatorship. This group
con someirly members of the 2 6th of July
Movsstropolitical elite, who have been
re^* the: with important positions in the
Cui^crac; are considered to be the most
inj foreigroup (to date) . This is due to
Fi(0's aersonal domination of the Cuban
gos decig process. Most importantly, the
fo-icy 1 of the fidelistas is tilted
toi-nued r armed revolution throughout the
Th, butLly in Latin America and Africa.
Tbta's :e to enhance Cuba's image as a
Tt powelutionary vanguard nation. They
bet sucird World interventions will not
oise Culge, but will also solidify (and
jieir bis privileged position within the
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Cuban governraent and probably result in incrsubsidies
from the Eastern Bloc and other "revolutionar^Lmes such
as Libya, Iran and Algeria.
The second most powerful group in the Oecision-
making apparatus is the raulistas. The ;tas are
members of the professional armed forces andity ser-
vices. As the top ranking officer in the Cubid Forces
or FAR, Fidel Castro's brother, Raul Castrands the
allegiance of officers in the security se^and the
professional military. This group also suppoactivist
foreign policy, including armed intervent Their
motives vary slightly with those of the fid^in that
they are more interested in improving the penaliza-
tion and experience of the armed forces tha)stering
revolution in the Third World. The raulist^ndebted
to the Soviets for continued support in the fconomic
aid, modern arms, and advanced military t The
raulistas therefore tend to be more suppor Soviet
objective in the Third World, especially when^s them
to improve the fighting capability of the proL Cuban
military. The armed interventions in Angola.a, the
PDRY, and Nicaragua, not to mention the smifiic^s
and military training missions performed Cubans
throughout the Third World, have succeeded ig the
Cuban Armed Forces a major military force, listas
power extends to Cuba's domestic scene as [Ref.
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14:pp. 68-78] Today, Cuba is by far the most militarized
society in Latin America. One out of every twenty Cubans
serves in the military or performs a security function. By
comparison, one percent of the population of the United
States serves in the regular armed forces. Cuba's military
effort is relatively 10 or 20 times greater than any other
nation in this hemisphere. High ranking Cuban officers
occupy many important positions in the Cuban bureaucracy.
[Ref. 16:p. 1108] For the raulistas, Cuba's overseas
military interventions provide the Cuban armed forces and
security services with invaluable combat experience. These
Third World conflicts have allowed the Cubans to operate and
maintain sophisticated Soviet-made hardware in actual battle
conditions, thus allowing them to test and revise doctrine
and tactics. An added benefit is that the weapons, ammuni-
tion, and fuel used in these conflicts does not come out of
the Cuban inventory. This means realistic fighting condi-
tions without the high economic cost normally associated
with high intensity combat or training.
The third group, the pragmatists, are made up of techno-
crats who are more concerned with building Cuba's economy
than engaging in costly military overseas interventions.
The pragmatists' influence in the Cuban government is, not
surprisingly, tied to the performance of the Cuban economy.
Needless to say, their influence has waned considerably.
Specifically, the drop in sugar prices in the mid-1970s
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preceded the drop in influence exercised by the pragma-
tists. Conversely, the fidelistas and raulistas were able
to pursue their objectives thanks to generous amounts of
Soviet aid which kept the Cuban economy afloat. The logic
behind the pragmatists ' decline was simply that during the
last decade, the economy has performed poorly while the
military and fidelistas have triumphed in Africa, Nicaragua,
and until 1983, Grenada. Today, the fidelistas and
raulistas control almost 80% of the important decision-
making positions in the Cuban government [Ref. 14:p. 73].
However, recent reports have shown the pragmatists may be
regaining some of their lost power in an effort to bolster
Cuba's poor economic performance. I will address this
development later in the thesis.
As the Cuban Revolution became more institutionalized,
Fidel Castro was forced to share power with other members of
the Government's bureaucratic elite. This is especially
true in the field of economic planning and management.
Despite the limitations imposed on Castro by the institu-
tionalization process, Fidel continues to play a decisive
role in the direction of Cuban foreign policy. In the
1970s, Castro emphasized the benefits of supporting armed
struggle over the possibility of improved relations with the
United States. (The latter policy is likely to be advocated
by more moderate pragmatists, who would by trying to limit
military spending and improve the Cuban economy through
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trade and investment from the United States.) In late 1975,
after Cuba's intervention in Angola was underx'/ay, Castro
declared that "there never will be relations with the United
States" if the "price" had to be Cuba's abandonment of its
"solidarity" with anti-imperialist movements in the Third
World [Ref. 15:p. 167]. This point should not be underesti-
mated. Castro sees himself as the first successful revolu-
tionary leader in the Western Hemisphere and maintains
ambitions to be the leader of the Third World. In Fidel's
view, the foundations of the Cuban government's legitimacy
is its commitment to revolution in the Third World. Even
twenty-seven years after the beginning of the Revolution,
the Cuban government feels obligated to maintain the revolu-
tionary mythos. Following a trip to Havana in 1977,
Congressman Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, III, stated that
"Castro's revolutionary image comes right out of Central
Casting." [Ref. 17] Revolutionary Cuban mythology claims
that Castro and his guerrillas defeated the well-equipped
Batista army with little or no outside help, and implies
that Cuba could perform similar miracles throughout the
Third World. ^ Revolutionary Cuban folklore continues to
depict the Cubans as the guerrilla elite of the world, and
promotes the image of Cuban soldiers as the spearhead in the
-^For an accurate account of the role of Castro's
guerrillas in Cuban Revolution, see Jaime Suchliki, Cuba
:
From Columbus to Castro , Charles Scribner's & Sons, 1974,
pp. 162-174.
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liberation of all of the Third World's oppressed peoples,
especially in Africa and Latin America.
Cuba's unique position as the only declared communist
state in the Western Hemisphere has long been a cause of
great concern to United States' decision-makers. In 1961,
Castro claimed that "he had always been a Marxist-Leninist,
and would be until the day he died." [Ref. 18 :p. 180]
Scholars around the world continue to debate the ideological
development and present orientation of Fidel Castro. Is
Castro a true communist? Or is he merely an opportunist
following a particular ideology to assure his primary bene-
factor, the Soviet Union, of his commitment to Marxist-
Leninist ideals? Moreover, how does Castro's ideological
orientation affect his perceptions of the world, and the
validity of promoting revolution? The evidence of Castro's
affinity to Marxism-Leninism is vague and contradictory.
Castro has done little to advance revolutionary thought in
Latin America in terms of Marxist ideology. Jaime Suchlicki
details in his book, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro , the
ideological development and transformation of the young
Fidel Castro in the decades prior to, and following, his
rise to power. According to Suchlicki, Fidel Castro was far
from being a Marxist before he came to power in Cuba.
Instead, Castro "belonged to Cuba's vague populist political
tradition." Earlier, great Cuban patriots such as Jose
Marti and Eduardo Chibas had called for an end to political
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corruption and the development of a unique and nationalistic
identity, but within a democratic framework. [Ref. 18: p.
182] Castro, on the other hand, was "strongly influenced by
falangist and fascist ideas while in high school and
Marxist-Leninist ideas while at the University of Havana."
This background convinced him to break with several
fundamental aspects of the teachings of Marti and Chibas.
Suchlicki writes:
While Marti and Chibas had envisioned reforms in a
democratic framework in a nation politically and
economically independent from the United States, they both
advocated friendly relations with the "northern colossus."
Castro did not. He was anti-U.S. since his student days
when he distributed anti-U.S. propaganda in Bogota.- As
Castro and part of the Cuban revolutionary leadership
perceived it, the possibility of a repetition of earlier
U.S. interventionist policies in Cuba was a major deter-
rent to achieving profound socioeconomic changes in the
island and the consolidation of Castro's personal rule
—
and Castro was committed to both of these goals. Perhaps
because of his anti-Americanism, and particularly his
conviction that a major revolution with himself in
absolute control could not be undertaken within Cuba's
political framework and in harmony with the United States,
he broke with the Marti-Chibas tradition and led a totali-
tarian and anti-American revolution. [Ref. 18 :p. 182]
Marxist-Leninism was a convenient tool for Castro to
gain the political support of the Cuban people and more
importantly the economic and military assistance of the
Soviet Union, while justifying his own position as the sole
leader of the Cuban Revolution.
Other scholars have also found it difficult to
corroborate Cuba's Marxist-Leninist credentials. Sheldon
Liss, a well-known diplomatic historian, recently examined
Marxist thought in Latin America and found the Cubans to be
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only minor contributors. Slightly over ten percent of
Liss's book, Marxist Thought in Latin Anerica , was devoted
to Cuba. [Ref. 19] This is a paltry amount considering the
Cuban regime has claimed to be a Marxist-Leninist state
since December of 1961. In fact, the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC) was an afterthought of the Cuban revolutionaries
rather than a vanguard party. Liss notes:
Revolutionary Left critics have accused the Cubans of
turning from theory as a guide to action, to action as a
means of building theory, and have noted that living
intellectuals did not play a major role in the early
stages of the revolution. [Ref. 19:p. 270]
Liss's criticism doesn't stop there. He later writes,
that from a theoretical perspective, the success of the
Cuban revolution meant that "Castro and his comrades proved
Marx, Engles, and Lenin wrong" [Ref. 19:p. 239].
Jorge Dominquez claims that, "the Cuban Revolution is
still difficult to explain from a Marxist-Leninist perspec-
tive and that no such serious analysis by Marxist scholars
exists." [Ref. 20:p. 107]
While we may never know the depth of Fidel Castro's
belief in Marxism-Leninism, an entire generation of Cubans
have been indoctrinated with Marxist-Leninist teachings. It
is difficult to ascertain what effect this has had on the
Cuban population's attitude toward fighting overseas in the
name of "proletarian internationalism" or enduring economic
deprivation at home. The Mariel exodus of 130,000 Cubans to
Florida in 1980 indicates that apparently a significant
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section of the population does not accept this
ideology.
Cuba's coinini to the Soviet interpretation of
Marxist-Leninist ogy, whether genuine or feigned,
allows Castro to easily pursue activist goals that he
would likely pursen if he had not declared that the
Cuban Revolution 'ided by Marxism-Leninism. The first
and most obviousfit that Cuba achieved by such a
declaration was c.ties with the Soviet Union. Follow-
ing the Bay of invasion and the Organization of
American States (Cade embargo of Cuba, it was clear to
Castro that only w could guarantee Cuba's security,
keep the island's my alive with massive aid, and build
the Cuban militaryie level of a regional power.
The second motig force was Fidel Castro's ambition
to make Cuba a ma^or in the world revolutionary move-
ment, with himsel the helm. Castro's adherence to
Marxism-Leninism c him to conceal his personal ambi-
tions behind the of "proletarian internationalism."
This fundamental :st conviction states that national
interests must be side for the interests of the world
communist movementie principle of "proletarian inter-
nationalism" was gisly used by the Soviets during the
Brezhnev years tc: the real motives behind Soviet
interventions in Ciiovakia in 1968 and the Third World
in the 1970s. Byj this principle as a justification
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for Cuban military activities in areas distant from Cuban
territory and security, the Cuban regime can confront United
States' interests globally.
Having the necessary ideological and institutional
motives to justify Castro's dream of worldwide revolution
and the demise of the United States is by itself insuffi-
cient to make that dream a reality. Other nations,
wealthier and more fanatic, such as Libya and Iran, have
similar revolutionary motives (although not Marxist-
Leninist)
,
yet their missions abroad have achieved less
impressive results than Cuba. Ironically, this is because
Cuba's geographic, demographic, and resource limitations
forced Castro to augment his resources and coordinate his
ambitions with his principle benefactor and defender--The
Soviet Union.
B. THE SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP
In Rose E Gottemoeller ' s study, Transforming Clients
into Surrogates; The Soviet Experience , the author
describes Cuba as "an almost ideal surrogate" of the Soviet
Union [Ref. 2:p. 2]. She believes Cuba maintains all of the
conditions required for a strong client relationship and
more. The conditions are:
1. Proximity of Cuba to a major opponent of the Soviet
Union.




A declared Marxist-Leninist regime firmly in control
of Cuba.
4. Existence of well-developed economy and professional
military establishment. [Ref. 2:p. 2]
Besides these four conditions, two additional factors
contribute to Cuba being more of a surrogate than just a
Soviet client.
The first condition is Cuba's regional and international
leadership aspirations, which permit Havana to align itself
with Moscow in order to realize its own ambitions. This
alliance is necessary for Cuba to augment its military and
political power.
The second condition stems from Cuba's position as a
privileged ally of the Soviet Union. As Cuba performs its
"internationalist" duty in a way that benefits Soviet
strategic policy, it is rewarded with increased Soviet
economic and political aid. [Ref. 2:p. 4]
The economic stranglehold Moscow has over the Cuban
economy is quite impressive. Cumulative Soviet economic aid
to Cuba from 1961 to 1982 increased significantly. In 1970,
the total amount of nonrepayable aid and trade subsidies was
$3,568 billion. By 1975 the figure had increased to a total
of $7,099 billion. By 1982, the amount of aid Cuba received
from the Soviets climbed to $29,246 billion. The amount of
Soviet economic aid to Cuba continues to grow along with
Havana's massive debt to Moscow and other members of the
Soviet bloc. [Ref. 21:pp. Bl, 28]
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.urn for their investment in Cuba, the Soviets
recstrategic base less than 90 miles from the United
Staong with a trained military willing to support
actDviet military actions in Africa, the Middle East
and?imerica. Cuba continually supports Soviet policy
in Drld forums, and assists the Soviets in espionage
act against the United States and its allies. Havana
hasroven to be a valuable ally in Moscow's ceaseless
eff' steal United States and Western military
tec:[Ref. 22:pp. 25, 35].
)ns between Havana and Moscow were seriously
strn the 1960s. The initial euphoria of Castro's
tritr Batista, followed by the successful defense of
theiion in 1961 against the CIA-backed Bay of Pigs
invitempt, gave the Cuban leadership a false sense of
poweecurity. However, after the humiliating experi-
encQving the Soviet Union withdraw its strategic
misrom Cuba following the October 1962 Cuban Missile
Crishout even consulting the Cuban regime, Cuban-
Sovitions began to strain.
early to mid 1960 's, in an effort to demonstrate
Cubaendence from Soviet doctrine and control and to
revithe Cuban Revolution, Castro attempted to spread
his : revolution in Latin America and Africa without
SovJstance or approval. In Cuba, Castro continued to
isol-Moscow members of the government, while abroad.
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he described '^e pro-Moscow communist parties in Latin
America and el'^^here as "pseudo-revolutionaries" because of
their adherem to the strategy of "peaceful roads toward
Socialism." (tro, Guevara and the other activists revolu-
tionary leads in Cuba wanted to promote revolution in
several Latinerican nations simultaneously, using armed
rural guerri: tactics, thus creating an uncontrollable
situation fohe United States and the Latin American
regimes in pc The long established pro-Moscow communist
parties in t countries were almost completely bypassed
by the Cubairategy. Castro's revolutionary strategy
immediately Cuba on a collision course with Soviet
foreign poli According to Jiri Valenta: .
Castro) was in favor of a "genuinely revolutionary
road," cr.zed the Soviet Union for dealing with
capital isfernments in Latin America. In adhering to
Ernesto " Guevara's concept of guerrilla/peasantry
insurgenc^tro ' s strategy in the Caribbean Basin and
elsewhere luth America in the 1960's, contradicted and
even chaed the Soviet doctrine allowing for
diversifisds to socialism. The Soviets in the late
1960 ' s wevilling and unable to sponsor Castro's call
to create or three," and even "four or five more
Vietnams" the United States in Latin America. As a
result, S-Cuban relations in the late 1960 's were
unsatisfac and at times strained almost to the
breaking l [Ref. 23:p. 201]
After tasco of the Guevara mission in Bolivia in
1967 the :s decided to pressure Cuba economically
until it mo its dangerous behavior. Oil supplies from
the Sovietn to Cuba were significantly reduced,
bringing thn economy to a virtual standstill. Because
of Moscow 'smic pressure, and confronted by ten years
57
of promoting revolutionary activity in the Third World
without success, Castro finally reached an understanding
with the Soviets in the early 1970s. A few years later,
when Moscow was expanding its influence in Africa and the
Middle East, Soviet and Cuban objectives in the Third World
merged. Most importantly, Cuba showed increased willingness
to become a full and active partner in military interven-
tions. The cooperation achieved between the Soviets and
Cubans in the Angolan intervention signaled that the Soviet-
Cuban relationship had matured. Thus, not only had Cuban
and Soviet interests in the Third World converged; both
nations had the necessary (and complementary) resources to
make the interventions practicable. That is, Cuba was
allowed to be a second rate military power in areas which
coincided with Soviet strategic interests.
As Gottemoeller points out:
The Soviet Union had built up its airlift and sealift
potential since the 1960s and had acquired experience in
using both in the Middle East. In general, the Soviets
seemed to have a better developed conception of the
logistics and command and control requirements. [Ref.
2:p. 15]
For the Cuban's part, she notes:
The Cubans complemented the Soviet command and support
structure with an armed force that had trained on Soviet
equipment. Annual Cuban imports of arms from the Soviet
Union had tripled between 1970 and 1975, and the Cubans
made use of the new arms and material to modernize their
army. [Ref. 2:p. 15]
Ironically, as the Cuban armed forces were expanded and
modernized with new Soviet equipment, their need inside Cuba
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decreased. Considering the post-Vietnam isolationism in the
United States, Watergate, and the policies of the Carter
Administration, the threat of United States invasion or
military attack against Cuba grew increasingly remote. The
unwillingness of the United States to become involved in
Third World conflicts also emboldened the Soviets to
intervene in conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
However, the Soviets thought it better to use effective
surrogates in order to mask their own involvement and mini-
mize the chances of superpower confrontation.
The Soviets also needed the Cuban Expeditionary Force
for more practical reasons. The history of Soviet involve-
ment in Africa and the Middle East has neither been wholly
successful nor consistent (in terms of the methods it has
used to win allies), with Moscow's experience in Egypt from
1955 to 1974 serving as a classic example. The Soviets
realized that they needed other methods of influencing
client states. By using racially acceptable, culturally
adept, and ideologically committed surrogate forces such as
the Cubans, the Soviets hoped to build Marxist-Leninist
infrastructures in place of personalist regimes common in
the Third World.
As far as active participation in Third World conflicts,
the Soviets have shown a reluctance to get too deeply
involved militarily, preferring instead to provide arms and
small advisory contingents to their chosen faction. In
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Angola, this would have been insufficient to achieve the
desired objective—securing the Marxist-led MPLA ' s control
of the country. At the start of the Angolan civil war, the
MPLA was not only poorly trained and ill-equipped, it was
numerically inferior to the other two factions and definite-
ly no match for the experienced South African forces
invading from the south. Soviet arms and advisors had to be
augmented by a large competent combat force capable of
utilizing this equipment along with modern military tactics.
In Angola, the Cuban combat forces proved to be the linchpin
that filled the void.
Six years earlier, in 1969, the Soviets were placed in a
similar dilemma when they supported the Nigerian government
during the Biafran conflict. Unwilling to provide the
necessary military personnel to operate new MIGs sent to
Lagos, the Soviets searched for competent surrogates. When
it became obvious that the Nigerians were unable to fly and
service the advanced MIG aircraft without outside help,
Egyptian pilots were brought in to assist them. The result
was inept Egyptians pilots bombing civilian targets. [Ref.
24 :p. 8] Hence, after experiences like the Nigerian Civil
War in 1969 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Soviets were
in need of a competent ally willing to commit their military
forces to train, service, and, if necessary, fight with
Soviet-supplied arms for Third World client states. The
Cubans later proved to be an ideal choice.
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The combination of Soviet willingness to supply and
support surrogates in Third World conflicts, and Cuba's
ability and enthusiasm to operate, maintain and fight with
advanced Soviet equipment overseas, allows Castro to pursue
his maximalist foreign policy objectives in what is known as
"cooperative intervention." Today, Cuba is allowed to purse
its strategic interests within the parameters of what the
Soviets consider the interests of international socialism,
i.e., fulfilling Moscow's strategic vision.
The Soviet-Cuban relationship has existed for the past
twenty-six years. Today, both sides understand each others'
goals and tactics, and level of tolerance. While Castro has
tested the Soviets patience a number of times, he has not
transcended the parameters of what the Soviets consider
their "strategic interests" since 1967. Castro realizes
that, because Cuba depends so heavily on Soviet economic aid
to its economy afloat, the Soviet Union can force Havana to




Havana's commitment to spread revolution throughout the
Third World does not, by itself, constitute a major threat
to the strategic interests of the United States. Other
radical Third World nations such as Vietnam, North Korea,
Iran and Libya also despise the West, specifically the
United States, and have tried to challenge Western interests
globally. Luckily for the West, these same nations have
been singularly limited in what they can do in pursuit of
these objectives by geographic isolation, poverty, poor
leadership, and most importantly, limited military
resources. Simply stated, these radical regimes do not
have, to date, the capability to further their "anti-
imperialist" goals on a global basis. Cuba, as a Third
World nation, requires substantial resources to implement
its military and paramilitary strategy in order to conduct
major military operations abroad. Confronted with limited
natural resources and a population of less than ten million,
Cuba must carefully structure its military, paramilitary and
intelligence services in order to overcome those limita-
tions. This section will briefly cover some of the more
important organizations used by the Cubans to perform Third
World interventions—with particular emphasis on the Cuban
Armed Forces and security services.
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Like most communist nations, a disproportionate amount
of Cuban wealth and population is allocated to the military
and security services. Today, Cuba is the most militarized
nation in the Western Hemisphere. Overall, 2.3% of the
Cuban population is in the regular armed forces and
approximately one out of every 20 Cubans performs a security
related mission. Neighboring Mexico, with seven times
Cuba's population, maintains a defense force only one half
the size of the Cuban armed forces. [Ref. 16:p. 1108]
The effort to change the Cuban Airmed Forces from a small
home defense force to a major military power with a global
interventionist capability has been a long and costly
program for the Cuban Government—not to mention their
Soviet sponsors.^ A brief look at Table 4 shows the
increase in arms transfers and the cost of this
transformation.
A. THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES
In addition to the massive military aid supplied to Cuba
from the Soviet Union, the Cubans have, with Soviet train-
ing, developed their armed forces so that such military aid
could best be utilized. Advanced military hardware does not
automatically translate into effective military capability,
as Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Israel's other foes have
^For an in-depth study of the growth of the Cuba Armed
Forces see Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Armed Forces and Foreign
Relations," in Blasier and Mesa-Lago (eds.), Cuba in the
World, Pittsburgh University Press, 1979, pp. 53-86.
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NOTE: ^The US£Lied nearly 100% of all arms,
with otsaw Pact members also contributing
Source: RGottemoeller , Transforming Clients in
Si5s: The Soviet Experience , Rand,
N^DP, 1985, p. 24
discovered ove/ears. In the early 1960s, the Cuban
armed forces vrgely a militia force composed of the
National Revoliy Militia (MNR) and the Committees for
the Defense oRevolution (CDR) . Following the ill-
fated Bay of Pasion in 1961, Castro was able to con-
vince the Soviid the Cuban people, of the need for a
large convent military. Consequently, Havana
strengthened t> and air force at the expense of MNR,
and transferrecost capable MNR leaders and soldiers to
the regular anile the emphasis in the early 1960s was
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id defm foreign attack, these forces were
sential'easing Castro's control over various
of Cutty. The result of Cuba's militariza-
a m chain of command throughout Cuban
and W2 Dominguez calls the "Civic-Soldier."
stro c the most insignificant bureaucratic
s, milficers (both fidelistas and raulistas)
! majoins, thus providing the Cuban military
Lth cod a tremendous source of manpower if
s neej diverted from civilian tasks to
opera
Cuban orces are known collectively as the
ArmadLucionarias (FAR) , or Revolutionary
rces. ;ions of the Cuban Armed Forces are to
territfense, to maintain internal security,
providry aid and/or combat assistance to
. foreiries or groups, i.e., power projection
orm ofitory capability.
FAR's uty manpower is estimated at 161,500
army cO , a navy of 13,500 and an air force
)0 [Re: 147]. Cuba's reserve capability is
impreath nearly all Cubans receiving some
• trail brief glance at Table 5 shows the
of thcmilitary over the past twenty-five
The il armed services within the FAR are
anced )us types of warfare specialty. While
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TABLE 5


























































































































































































* Includes air defense forces
** Reservists on active duty were included this year
(60,000 in the army)
N.A. Data not available
Sources: The New York Times and the IISS The Military
Balance
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the Cuban army will always be the backbone of the FAR, the
navy and air force have been equipped with modern ships and
combat aircraft since the early 1970s. The following is a
detailed look at the development of the three major branches
of the Cuban armed forces. The primary source for this
information is International Institute for Strategic
Studies' Militarv Balance from 1970 to 1985.
1. The Cuban Army
The army has consistently consumed about 4/5ths of
the FAR's manpower. Beginning in 1970, the Soviets began to
supply large quantities of tanks and armored personnel
carriers (APCs) to the Cuban Army to transform the army from
an infantry force to a semi-mechanized force. The PT-76
light tank and the T-55 medium tank were first introduced
into the Cuban inventory in 1970, along with over 200 APCs
transferred the same year. By 1985, the Cuban army was
composed of 1 armored division, 3 mechanized divisions along
with 13 infantry divisions. The infantry divisions are
usually manned at about 60% of their full strength, with the
other 40% coming from the reserves. All Cuban combat units,
divisions, battalions, etc., are smaller in the number of
men assigned than similar American or Soviet units. This
requires the Cubans to modify Soviet tactical doctrine in
order to conform to the smaller units. Combat tactics will
be discussed in the following chapter.
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The Soviet Union continued gradually to build up the
Cuban armed forces throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.
Following Havana's active military role in Africa in the
mid-1970s, Moscow drastically increased its shipments of
sophisticated weapons to Cuba. For example, Soviet tank and
APC transfers to Cuba remained at a low yet steady level
until 1977, when the Soviets first delivered 50 T-62 medium
tanks to the FAR. In 1978, 200 more APCs were delivered to
Havana along with 15 FROG surface-to-surface missiles, and
an unknown number of ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns and SA-7
Grail SAMs. The timing of these deliveries, occurring
before and after Castro's major military interventions in
Syria, the PDRY, Angola and Ethiopia, may indicate that the
Cuban armed forces were unable to absorb the equipment in
the intervening years because too high a percentage of their
armored forces were deployed overseas. The Cubans were
already being supplied indirectly by the Soviets in the
Middle East, Angola and Ethiopia. It should be remembered
that Cubans training and fighting in Africa and the Middle
East were doing so with equipment supplied by Moscow to the
local regime. Cuban stocks of arms and ammunition are not
affected by Havana's military ventures overseas. After
these interventions were accomplished, the Soviets resumed
supplying major quantities of arms directly to Havana. The
new deliveries in 1977-78 may have been a Soviet reward for
services rendered. [Ref. 2:p. 19] Another explanation for
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Cuba not receiving substantial shipments of Soviet arms in
the 1970s may be that Soviet arms stockpiles, airlift and
sealift could not support simultaneous efforts in the Middle
East (1973-74) , Africa (1974-78) and to Cuba. In the mid to
late 1970s, Cuban officials publicly acknowledged the new
weapons deliveries in speeches. In his report to the Cuban
Communist Party Congress in December 197 5, Fidel indicated
that the FAR would be supplied with a "considerable amount
of even more modern combat equipment characterized by
increased firepower, maneuverability and automation." [Ref.
27 :p. 25] Raul Castro, the highest-ranking officer of the
FAR, declared less than a year later that the Cuban armed
forces were being outfitted with "new and modern arms which
will be viewed by our people for the first time." [Ref.
27:p. 25]
In the late 1970s and 1980s, Cuba became one of the
leading recipients of Soviet arms. The Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has placed Cuba
eighth in the world among the 2 largest Third World major-
weapon importing countries during the 1979 to 1984 reporting
period. Havana received 3.7 percent of the total Third
World weapons imports during that period. [Ref. 28: p. 3 51]
The history of Soviet military transfers to Cuba is
a strong indicator of Havana's ability to absorb and main-
tain large quantities of advanced Soviet hardware. It also
symbolizes Moscow's confidence in the Cuban political
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leadership, and the professionalization of the Cuban Armed
Forces. This is critical for these transfers to continue.
Unlike many other Third World recipients of Soviet military
equipment, Cuba is unable to pay for any of this lavish
military aid. Given this, it seems clear that the Soviets
transfer advanced military equipment to Cuba with the belief
that Castro will use it to further Cuban foreign policy
objectives within the parameters of Soviet strategic
interests.
This accommodation between Moscow and Havana seems
to be working well in the 1980s. The Cuban defense budget
grew by 26% from 1984 to 1985. [Ref. 29:p. 36] Only
massive Soviet economic and military aid could make such a
growth rate possible. See Table 6 for a list of Cuban
ground equipment.
2 . The Cuban Navv
The Cuban navy consists of 13,500 officers and
sailors, of which 8,500 are conscripts. Although the Navy
is considered primarily a coastal defense force, it has
recently acquired a blue-water capability. The Navy's most
lethal assets are the three new-construction Foxtrot-class
submarines transferred by the Soviets to Cuba from 1979 to
1982. These diesel-electric submarines are far more capable
than the German World War II models which were so successful
in interdicting Allied shipping in the Caribbean in 1942.
Besides their ability to carry 22 torpedos, the Foxtrots can
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TABLE 6
SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE CUBAN ARMY
TANKS: 325 T-34, 350 T-54/-55, 160 T-62 ; light tanks: 55
PT-7 6
ARC'S: 75 BRDM-1/-2 ; 50 BMP; 500 BTR-40/-60/-152
ARTILLERY: 1,400: incl M-1942 76mm, 85mm, 100 SU-100 SP,
122mm, M-46 130mm, D-1, D-2 , ML-20 152mm
MOBILE ROCKET LAUNCHERS: BM-21 122mm, BM-14 140mm, BM-24
2 4 0mm
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES: 65 FROG-4/7
MORTARS: M-4 3 12 0mm
ANTI-TANK WEAPONS: 600: M-1943 57mm, M-45 85mm, T-12
100mm, 57mm RCL and Sagger and Snapper guided
missiles
MISC: 60 JS-2 heavy and T-34/85 main battle tanks
Source: The Military Balance: 1985-1986
.
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1985
also carry up to 44 naval mines and numerous combat swimmers
for covert mining and demolition operations far from Cuban
shores. The Cuban navy recently received two new Koni-class
frigates from the Soviets. While these frigates are mainly
used for anti-submarine warfare, they also have a limited
shore-bombardment, anti-surface, and anti-aircraft capabili-
ty. The newly constructed Koni frigates have 2,000 nautical
mile range, which would allow them to support Cuban opera-
tions in Africa and the entire Caribbean Basin. The Navy
has numerous missile and torpedo patrol craft, including at
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least 18 OSA missile boats, the same type of craft which
proved effective in combat in both the Arab-Israeli war of
1967, and in the current Iran-Iraq war. Even so, it is
unlikely that these missile patrol boats would engage in
blue-water operations outside of Cuban territorial waters.
However, since the Soviets have transferred these OSA-class
crafts to many Third World clients, it is conceivable that
Cuban crews could use indigenous OSA PTGs if the client
nation requested assistance from Havana. The Cuban Navy has
a small but increasingly effective amphibious warfare capa-
bility, spearheaded by its acquisition of two Polnocny-class
LSM landing ships. The Polnocnys are each capable of
carrying 180 tons, five tanks, or 250 combat troops [Ref.
30:p. 116]. These ships are also armed for supporting an
amphibious assault. Havana's mine warfare threat must also
be taken into consideration, since the offensive and defen-
sive mine warfare capability of the Cuban Navy has increased
considerably since 1978 [Ref. 31:p. 1064]. The Cubans are
able to contribute to Soviet mining operations distant from
its shores with its merchant ships, surface warfare craft,
and its Foxtrot submarines. In the Caribbean Basin, areas
where this capability could pose a serious threat to United
States' strategic interests are the Panama Canal and U.S.
ports in the Gulf of Mexico [Ref. 32].
Recent unconfirmed reports claim that in 1985-86,
the Cuban Navy received two more Sonya-class minesweepers
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and four Stenka-class patrol boats from the Soviet Union
[Ref. 29:p. 36]. If true, this would be the first transfer
by the Soviets of the Stenka-class ships to the Cuban Navy.
Bulgaria, who received three Stenka-class patrol boats in
1977, is the only other recipient of this Soviet-built fast
attack craft. The Soviets have 90 more Stenkas in their
inventory. [Ref. 33: p. 79] The Cuban Navy also operates
numerous intelligence and support ships for Cuban and Soviet
naval operations in the Caribbean (see Table 7)
.
3 . The Cuban Air Force
The Cuban air force and air defense forces incorpor-
ate all air defense forces other than those engaged in the
immediate air defense of the Army and Navy. There are
collectively known as the Defensa Anti-Aerea y Fuerza Aerea
Revolucionaria, or more commonly DAAFAR. DAAFAR operates
and maintains a variety of modern Soviet aircraft, surface-
to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft guns not only in Cuba,
but also in a number of Third World countries. Havana's air
force is believed to have a sufficient number of skilled and
professional pilots and support personnel to fly and
maintain various types of Soviet combat fighter-bombers,
helicopters, transport, and training aircraft. Cuba's
ground-attack and helicopter pilots currently receive
extensive training and combat experience in Angola,
Ethiopia, the People's Democratic of Yemen, Nicaragua and




Personnel: 13,500, (8,500 Conscripts)
Ship Type Number
Submarines
Foxtrot-class (SS) , diesel/attack 3
Whiskey-class (SS) , diesel/attack 1
(used for training)
Surface Combatants




OSA-1 (4 STYX surface-to-surface missiles each) 5
OSA-II (4 STYX surface-to-surface missiles each) 13
KOMAR (2 STYX surface-to-surface missiles each) 5




Fast Attack Craft (Patrol)
ZHUK 25







Source: The Military Balance; 1985-1986
.
International Institute for Strategic
Studies, London, 1985
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of the MIG-21 in 1965, Cuba became the first Latin American
nation with a supersonic fighter-bomber aircraft [Ref. 34 :p.
216] . Since the early 1970s, the Air Force has been
modernized, and now consists of over 250 combat aircraft,
with 53 MIG-23S recently added to the inventory. The Cuban
air defense forces also received SA-3 and SA-6 systems to
upgrade their extensive air defense coverage. Besides
operating, maintaining, and training select Third World
allies in the proper use of this equipment, the Cuban air
defense system is a formidable barrier to punitive strikes
by United States' air forces. It is likely that Cuba's air
defense network would cause serious losses for American air-
craft trying to neutralize Cuban bases and military
installations early in any conventional war (see Tables 8
and 9) .
The United States and its regional allies should be
concerned by the threat posed by the Cuba Air Force's
ability to interdict shipping and provide close air support
to advancing ground forces. In May of 1980, Cuban MIGs sank
a Bahamian Coast Guard Boat, "The Flamingo" in Bahamian
territorial waters without provocation. Four of the
Flamingo's crew were killed. [Ref. 35: p. 11] The combat
range of the Cuban Air Force has been greatly expanded






























MIG-8 (20 Armed) 40
MI-24 Hind D 18
IL-14 16
AN-2 35






Source: The Military Balance: 1985-1986 .









In addition to the above, the following antiaircraft weapons
exist in the Cuban inventory:







—M-53 (Twin)/BTR 60P (30mm)
—SA-7 (MSL)
—SA-9 (MSL)
While the Cuban Air Force maintains a sufficient
number of medium-range transports for Caribbean operations,
it lacks an adequate long-range airlift capability. Cuba's
transport aircraft consist mainly of AN-2, AN-24 and AN-26
passenger aircraft with a limited paratroop capability.
These smaller transports are capable of ferrying Cuban
combat troops with only light infantry weapons and mortars.
For large-scale interventions such as the 1975 Angolan
expedition, Cuba must depend on the Soviet military airlift
(VTA) for air transport, Soviet merchant ships, or its own
merchant marine, to move heavier equipment such as
artillery, tanks, APCs, and large numbers of troops.
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DAAFAR, like the Army and Navy, is organized into
three air defense zones, Western, Central, and Eastern. The
Western Air Zone, which includes Havana, is the most impor-
tant zone and is believed to contain two interceptor, two
fighter-bomber, one fighter/ground attack and two transport
squadrons. All of the DAAFAR 's training elements are
believed to be located in the Western Air Zone. The Central
Air Zone contains four interceptor squadrons, four fighter-
bomber squadrons, one fighter/ground-attack and one trans-
port squadrons. Little is known about the Eastern Air Zone,
but given the fact that the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo is
located in eastern Cuba, a large number of combat aircraft
and anti-aircraft missiles and guns are probably stationed
in the Eastern Air Zone. [Ref. 36:p. 217]
In terms of education, morale, and training, the
officers and enlisted in the Cuban Armed Forces are the best
in Latin America. The Defense Intelligence Agency's
Handbook of the Cuban Armed Forces , describes the Cuban
soldier in the following terms:
The Cuban soldiers are literate and well trained in their
specialty. They are politically indoctrinated, well
disciplined and loyal. They are accustomed to simple
living conditions. [Ref. 37:p. 2-11]
Officers are characterized as:
. . . educated, highly motivated, heavily indoctrinated,
well trained and accustomed to nonpretentious living
conditions. Those who are in their twenties probably have
attended military schools since their teenage years, and
they are used to an atmosphere of unquestioned obedience.
The officer is probably a member of either the Union of
Young Communists (UJC) or its parent organization, the
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Cuban Communist Party (PCC) , and is a respected member of
the community. [Ref. 37 :p. 2-12]
In summary, for a nation its size, the Cuban Armed
Forces' ability to fulfill its mission of home defense and
support for select clients in the Third World is excellent.
In conventional warfare, the Cuban capabilities are impres-
sive and constantly improving. Adrian English, a specialist
on the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces for Jane's,
summarizes the Cuban military in these terms:
While the old pre-revolutionary Cuban Army and Navy
were among the most militarily unimpressive forces in
Latin America, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
constitute the most formidable armed force in the region
. . . providing an effective deterrent to any temptation
to armed intervention in Cuba itself, even by a major
power such as the United States and with a proven combat
record in recent post-colonial wars in Africa and
elsewhere. [Ref. 38:p. 150]
B. INTELLIGENCE AND PARA-MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
Besides the uniformed personnel in the Cuban Revolution-
ary Armed Forces, or FAR, the Cubans have an extensive
intelligence and paramilitary apparatus. Havana maintains a
number of clandestine services which are responsible for
intelligence and propaganda operations, in addition to
supporting actively Havana's revolutionary allies around the
world. Most Third World dictatorships have intelligence
services to uncover and crush internal opposition to their
regimes. Cuba's intelligence service is unigue in that its
mission, besides internal security, is to work worldwide and
operate closely with Soviet bloc intelligence services.
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Jeffrey T. Richelson, a noted scholar of both Western
and Soviet bloc intelligence organizations, notes that the
Soviet use of the Cuban intelligence services to augment the
capability of the Soviet intelligence agencies is consistent
with Soviet practices around the world. [Ref. 39 :p. 205]
The Cuban Intelligence services provide Moscow with more
than just increased resources devoted to intelligence
collection and covert operations in the Western Hemisphere.
The Cuban services are sometimes able to operate in coun-
tries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia which are diplo-
matically off limits to the Soviets. The Soviets have also
employed the Cuban services to perform certain "dirty jobs"
such as assassination and drug smuggling, which allows
Moscow to deny involvement should the perpetrators be
apprehended. [Ref. 39 :p. 206]
In return for helping the Soviets, the Cubans have
received the necessary equipment, training and contacts to
transform the Cuban intelligence services from a small
organization dedicatee to domestic surveillance into a major
intelligence network active worldwide. Today the Cubans
maintain three separate intelligence and security organiza-
tions operated by the Ministry of the Interior, one security
service within the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces, and two services under the direct control of the
Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee.
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The Ministry of the Interior, headed by its new
director, General Jose Arbantes Fernandez, operates the
Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI—Direccion General
de Inteligencia) , the Department of State Security (DSE
—
Departmento de Sequridad del Estado) , and the Directorate of
Special Operations (DOE—Direccion de Operaciones
Especiales) . The main Cuban intelligence service
responsible for foreign intelligence collection is the DGI.
The DGI's director, Jose Mendez Cominches, replaced the
previous DGI chief, Manuel Pinero Losada, in 1971. This
change of DGI directors was part of a major reorganization
of the DGI, which greatly increased Soviet control and
influence of DGI operations. [Ref. 39:pp. 210-211]
The DGI has six divisions divided into two categories:
the Operational Divisions and the Support Divisions. The
Operational Divisions are the Political/Economic Intelli-
gence Division, the External Counterintelligence Division,
and the Military Intelligence Division. The DGI's Support
Divisions are the Technical Support Division, also known as
the M-1 Division, the Information Division, and the
Preparation Division. [Ref. 39:p. 211]
The DGI's Political/Economic Intelligence Division, like
the KGB, is divided into four sections: 1) Eastern Europe,
2) the United States, Canada and Mexico Section, 3) Western
Europe, and 4) the African, Asian and Latin American
Section. The External Counterintelligence Division of the
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DGI operates against Cuban exiles (primarily in the United
States), and against foreign intelligence services. The
DGI ' s Military Intelligence Division operates against the
armed forces of the United States, NATO and other select
nations. Given the high priority the Soviet Union places on
acquiring Western military technology, it is likely that
this unit is active in the theft of NATO military secrets
and hardware. There exists documented evidence of DGI
agents operating out of Cuban embassies in Western Europe,
especially against the armed forces of Great Britain, Spain,
France and Italy.
The Technical Support Division makes it possible for the
DGI to function like any other major intelligence service.
It provides the sophisticated communications and espionage
equipment, including microfilm processing, codes, and
facilities for the production of false passports and other
documents. The Information Division processes and analyzes
the enormous volume of information collected by the DGI's
field agents and technical collection assets. Little is
known of (or can be said about) the functions of the
Preparation Division at the unclassified level. [Ref. 39 :p.
211]
Overall, the cjuality of the DGI's operations are
believed to be quite impressive. According to another
author and expert on the KGB, John Barron, the KGB considers
the DGI one of its most important and trustworthy satellite
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services: "The Cubans are best at influence operations,
both in the United States and the Third World, and their
analyses of the United States are outstanding." [Ref. 40: p.
383] The DGI ' s success in the United States is understanda-
ble since (according to DGI defectors) it is believed that
there are up to 3,000 DGI agents operating in the United
States. Their missions, according to former DGI agent Mario
Estebes Gonzales, include spying on fellow exiles and
running vast quantities of drugs into the United States.
[Ref. 41 :p. 27] While the actual number of DGI agents in
the United States may be smaller than the estimates given by
DGI defectors, a number of independent sources have docu-
mented widespread DGI activity in this country. Many DGI
agents in the United States, like Estebes, are trained in
sabotage, and could turn their skills on strategic targets
located anywhere in the United States.
The DGI has worked closely with the KGB (since the
beginning of Soviet-Cuban relations) , if not directly under
the Soviet intelligence organization since 1970. Orlando
Castro Hidalgo, a former DGI agent in Paris until his defec-
tion in 1969, explained that one of the conditions imposed
on Castro in the late 1960s was DGI subservience to the KGB,
making the KGB-DGI relationship similar to those of other
Eastern bloc intelligence agencies [REf. 42]. In 1970, KGB
Colonel Viktor Simonev took control as the unofficial
director of the DGI, personally approving all of the DGI
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operational plans and budgets. Since that time, the DGI ' s
operational budget and number of agents have increased sub-
stantially. [Ref. 43: p. 9] The cooperation between the KGB
and DGI prevents duplication of effort and maximizes
efficiency. In 1983, Arnaud de Borchgrave testified before
Congress that the Soviet KGB and Cuban DGI operate freely in
the United States, and that "the DGI regards internal
security in the U.S. as a joke." [Ref. 44] The DGI is also
believed to be responsible for the training of guerrillas
and terrorists from around the world, and particularly,
those from Colombia and Central America.
As large and as sophisticated as the DGI is, it only
represents one of five Cuban intelligence services which
operate overseas. The largest Cuban intelligence organiza-
tion is the Ministry of the Interior's Department for State
Security (DSE) . Modeled after the KGB, the DSE ' s principal
mission is to monitor and crush any domestic opposition to
the Castro Regime. Yet the DSE is also active abroad. The
DSE counterintelligence responsibilities allows it to pene-
trate Cuban exile groups in the United States, Europe, and
Latin America. The DSE's expertise and success in keeping
the Castro government secure from internal dissent has been
shared with other fledgling Marxist regimes in Africa and
most recently Grenada and Nicaragua. These regimes, in an
effort to build up their security services as quickly as
possible, invited large numbers of the Cuban specialists as
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soon as they arrived in power. Jiri Valenta, a Sovietolo-
gist familiar with the workings of the Sandinistas' internal
security apparatus, claims that the Cubans oversee nearly
all counterintelligence operations in Nicaragua [Ref. 45:pp.
11-12]
.
One Cuban intelligence organization within the Ministry
of the Interior is a conventional military force, the
Department of Special Operations or DOE. Commanded by
Central Committee member Brig. Gen. Pascual Martinez Gil,
the DOE is an elite special forces detachment composed of at
least two battalions of MININT special troops (totaling an
estimated 1,000 men). The DOE battalions are usually the
first troops deployed to support a Cuban ally in any inter-
vention. The DOE troops are highly motivated, well educated
and selected from the best of both the armed forces and the
Ministry of the Interior. The DOE has operated extensively
in Africa (they were among the first Cuban troops to enter
Angola in 1975) and Latin America. During the final
Sandinista offensive against the Somoza regime, Cuban
military advisors from the DOE fought alongside the FSLN and
maintained direct communications with Havana. A number of
these advisors were wounded and were returned to Cuba via
Panama. [Ref. 35 :p. 6]
The mission of the DOE ' s estimated 1,000 commandos is
best described in a 1983 Rand Corporation study by Edward
Gonzales:
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Cuba's institutional outreach in support of revolutionary
movements and regimes in the Caribbean Basin has been
further enhanced by the professionalization of the FAR and
the creation of the Special Troops Battalion in the
Ministry of Interior (MINIT) .... The Special Troops
Battalion within MININT is under Fidel Castro's personal
command. It serves as an all-purpose elite force capable
of being dispatched abroad in a crisis situation. . . .
The Special Troops Battalion could also be used to back a
pro-Cuba faction in an internal power struggle in a
friendly Basin country. [Ref. 14 :p. 15]
The Ministry of the Interior also controls Cuba's Border
Guard Troops (TGF) . While it is unlikely that many of these
3,000 troops would be deployed overseas in a military role,
they could provide valuable training for the border guards
of friendly Marxist regimes in Africa and Nicaragua, much
like the DSE advisors.
The Ministry of the Interior is controlled by a mixture
of fiedlistas and raulistas With the ouster of Ramiro
Valdes as Minister of the Interior in 1985 (long considered
the third-ranking official in the Cuban government after
Raul Castro, and possible successor to Fidel) , the raulistas
managed to increase their influence in both the Armed Forces
and the MININT. However, the new Minister of the Interior,
Division General Jose Abrantes, is considered fiercely loyal
to Fidel, and therefore an important fidelista. [Ref. 46 :p.
53] As mentioned previously, both the fiedlistas and
raulistas are supportive of an interventionist foreign
policy, and the recent changes in the MININT should not
cause much of a change in Cuba's current strategy.
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Cuban interventionist policy does not rely entirely on
the Cuban armed forces or organizations subordinate to the
Ministry of the Interior. Since the early 1970s, the
Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party has played an
increasingly active role in "scouting" Third World countries
for revolutionary opportunities. The Cuban Communist Party
(PCC) acts as a broker for revolutionary or radical regimes.
The Department of Foreign Relations (DGRE) and the America
Department (DA) are the organizations used by the Central
Committee to carry out its policies. The DGRE maintains
contact with communist parties and other leftist organiza-
tions around the world. The America Department is theoret-
ically a section of the DGRE but, due to the importance Cuba
places on contacts with revolutionary regimes and groups in
the Western Hemisphere, the DA is in fact an independent
service. The director of the America Department is former
DGI director Manuel Pinero Losada, another member of the
Central Committee. The DA maintains strong ties with the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua, guerrilla groups throughout
Central and South America and, until October of 1983, the
Grenadian Government under Maurice Bishop.
The America Department has been instrumental in helping
Latin American guerrilla groups overcome their internal
factionalism in order to build a united front. As early as
1977, prior to the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in
Nicaragua, the America Department's Airmando Ulises Estrada
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engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the Sandinistas
guerrillas and Havana. Castro promised the guerrillas
increased support (in the form of arms and advisors)
contingent on guerrilla cooperation. After the Sandinistas
came to power in July of 1979, the chief of the Cuban
America Department/DGI operations center in Costa Rica,
Julian Lopez Diaz, was named Ambassador to Nicaragua.
Lopez's Assistant in Costa Rica, Andres Barahona, was
redocumented as a Nicaraguan and placed in charge of the new
Sandinista intelligence service, the General Directorate of
State Security (DGSE) . [Ref . 35:p. 6] The America Depart-
ment was also deeply involved in assisting the Grenadian
Revolution prior to the joint U. S . -Caribbean intervention in
October of 1983. Cuba's former ambassador to Grenada, Jose
Torres Rizo, a member of the America Department, provided
the Grenadian regime with detailed reports on how to
suppress dissent on the island, including the Catholic
Church. Numerous documents captured by U.S. forces were
signed by the director of the America Department, Manuel
Pinero Losada, testifying to the role of the America Depart-
ment in building, and protecting, the Grenadian Revolution.
It is important to remember that Pinero was removed from his
job as director of DGI in 1971, at a time when the Soviets
were increasing their control of the DGI. Pinero 's position
as director of the America Department possibly indicates
88
that the DA enjoys slightly more autonomy from Soviet
oversight and control than the DGI
.
The Cubans, like the Soviets, also run an enormous
propaganda machine to assist them in political influence
operations, disinformation, forgeries, and the establishment
of pro-Cuban front groups. For example, the Cuban news
agency Prensa Latina broadcasts over 2,500 news dispatches
on two national and twelve international radio circuits
daily. These news broadcasts are available in Spanish,
Portuguese, English and French. The actual dispatches can
be obtained from one of Prensa Latina 's 36 branch offices
around the world. No government in Latin America can equal
the broadcasting service of Radio Havana. Cuban propaganda
attempts to discredit states and individuals allied with the
United States, or opposed to Cuban efforts in Central
America. [Ref. 47:p. 2]
Another favorite influence and propaganda tool of the
Cubans is the Cuban Institute for Friendship Among Peoples
(ICAP) . This organization claims to have chartered 113
local Cuban friendship societies throughout the world.
Besides influencing idealistic students in Europe, North
America and the Third World, ICAP engages in talent scouting
for future Cuban recruitment of guerrillas, terrorists, or
propagandists. [Ref. 47 :p. 3]
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C. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD
Since the early 1970s, the Cuban government has managed
to increase drastically the number of nations with which it
maintains full diplomatic relations. This has been Havana's
goal since its diplomatic isolation by the Western
Hemisphere during the 1960s. Castro has worked hard to
assure Cuba's neighbors that Cuba no longer poses a threat
to their security. During the 1960s, Cuba made the tactical
blunder of openly supporting nearly all revolutionary
guerrilla groups in Latin America bent on overthrowing the
established government. By not distinguishing between
authoritarian, democratic and dictatorial regimes, Castro
successfully isolated Cuba from every country in Latin
America, save Mexico. Following Havana's diplomatic
isolation, Cuban operations were confined to its own
geographic boundaries with the exception of small and
usually unsuccessful raids by guerrilla bands. After Che
Guevara's failure in Bolivia, Castro realized that an end to
Cuba's diplomatic isolation was critical for both economic
and strategic reasons. By the early 1970s, this new policy
began to bear fruit as many Latin American nations opened
diplomatic relations with Havana. The new Cuban embassies
proved critical in Cuba's effort to promote revolution in
Latin America. Like the Soviet Union, Cuba maintains diplo-
matic relations with the very same countries that it
attempts to undermine. This way Havana is able to maintain
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a presence in a country while establishing contacts with
"revolutionary" elements within the target nation. In 1981,
Colombia suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba for the
second time in twenty years. Bogata could no longer
tolerate Cuba's support for Colombian M-19 guerrillas and
some of Colombia's most notorious drug traffickers. [Ref.
35:p. 11]
Cuba's legal diplomatic presence in Latin America,
Africa, Asia, Western Europe, the United States, and Canada,
provides the Cubans with an invaluable resource: access to
target countries, and communication with revolutionary
allies (see Table 10) . The Cuban diplomatic presence in
these countries is used much the same way Colonel Qhadaffi's
Libya uses their diplomatic missions in many of the same
countries: for terrorism, espionage, and subversion.^ Many
Cuban "diplomats" have been expelled from Canada, Britain,
France, Spain, and other European countries for espionage
and other "non-diplomatic" activities. On July 10, 1975,
France expelled three Cuban diplomats for their links to the
international terrorist "Carlos." Less than a month
earlier, on June 27, 1975 Carlos (Ilich Ramierz Sanchez)
killed two French counterintelligence officers and a
Leganese informant in Paris. [Ref. 48: pp. 14-19]
^Appendix A details official Cuban diplomatic represen-
tation abroad, including countries where Cuba maintains a
designated military attache. Countries which have suspended
diplomatic relations with Cuba are also mentioned.
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TABLE 10
COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH CUBA
























































































Phi 1 1 pp I nes
Seyc he 1 1 as
Sri Lanka






































Source; Central Intelligence Agency, Directory of
Officials of the Republic of Cuba: A Reference
Aid . CR 85-13573, November 1985, pp. 165-182
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While the full extent of Cuban illegal activities
operating out of their overseas diplomatic missions cannot
be fully described on the unclassified level, it suffices to
say that these embassies and consulates lend themselves
considerably to overseas interventions.
D. THIRD WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ALLIES
The Cuban Government has developed a highly sophisti-
cated network of contacts with other radical regimes, in
addition to its ties with revolutionary, guerrilla and
terrorist organizations out of power. Havana is aware of
its demographic and economic limitations, and realizes the
importance of building alliances with revolutionary move-
ments in order to increase its effectiveness and range.
While the Soviet Union finances many of Havana's overseas
adventures, Moscow has not shown great interest in
supporting Cuban-led insurgencies or terrorist organiza-
tions, especially in the Western Hemisphere. What little
aid Moscow provides to these groups comes with many strings
attached on how it can be used. Castro has naturally been
offended by Moscow's attempt to control his revolutionary
programs. As a result, he has tried since the early 1960s
to build strong ties with radical groups and governments
willing to further Cuba's revolutionary vision. Probably
the most blatant attempt by Castro to build an alliance of
Third World revolutionary groups and nations occurred in
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1966, when Cuba hosted the Tricontinental Conference in
Havana
.
Never before, or since, has such a group of radical
states, terrorist organizations, and guerrilla fronts been
assembled. Moscow wanted to use the forum to "grapple with
the Chinese," and to further its Third World credentials.
Castro had other ideas. According to Wayne S. Smith:
The Soviets thus thought they had won most of the
marbles. They expected Castro to invite parties and
groups sympathetic to Moscow, and once these were included
in the expanded organization, Moscow would be in a
position to elbow the Chinese aside . . . instead, Castro
invited every radical revolutionary group he could think
of, including many that were decidedly out of favor with
Moscow. The traditional communist parties were largely
bypassed. The congress itself, moreover, was turned into
a Fidelista circus, with call after call for armed
struggle and confrontation with the imperialists on a
global basis. . . [Ref. 49:pp. 20-21]
Through the Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought to
enlist the support of North Vietnam and North Korea and
create a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism.
The Conference explains how Cuba initiated contracts with
guerrilla and terrorist groups "beyond the fringe" of the
Marxist-Leninist movement. While many of these groups have
disappeared, many are still viable threats to the stability
of nations such as Colombia and Spain. In the latter case,
Cuba's contacts with the M-19 guerrillas go back to the
1960s, while Havana started training Basque terrorists
(known collectively by the acronym ETA) as early as 1964.
[Ref. 50:p. 9]
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While a complete list of all of the terrorist and
guerrilla organizations supported and trained by Havana
cannot be mentioned here, I will address a few major groups
because of their ability to jeopardize American security,
property, and citizens abroad, especially in the Western
Hemisphere.
In the late 197 0s, the Cuban DGI and America Department
created the Junta for Revolutionary Coordination (JCR) to
act as an umbrella organization for all Latin American
terrorist and guerrilla organizations. Members of the JCR
believe in the Cuban model of revolutionary warfare and are
provided with false documents, arms, training, and contacted
with other revolutionary countries and groups. Countries
which have cooperated with the JCR in the past include
Nicaragua, Libya, Syria, Iraq, the PDRY, North Korea, and
Vietnam. Some of the groups with strong JCR ties are the
PLO, ETA, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) , the Red Army
Faction, and any other organizations willing to sponsor or
support JCR members.
According to the testimony of Daniel James (an expert on
Latin American terrorist groups) before the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Security and Terrorism, the five major Puerto
Rican terrorist organizations were unified by a Puerto Rican
member of the DGI assigned to the Cuban mission to the
United Nations. The agent, Filiberto Inocencia Ojeda Rios,
managed to unite the five groups which have been responsible
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for over 260 violent acts in Puerto Rico, and another 100 in
the United States. [Ref. 43:pp. 181-206]
In guerrilla warfare, Havana now prefers to unite
indigenous guerrilla forces by promising to provide them
military support and training if they work as a coalition.
This method proved to be highly effective in Nicaragua with
the Sandinistas, and to a lesser degree in El Salvador with
the FMLN. The Cubans have also tried this method in
Guatemala with less spectacular results. [Ref. 35:pp. 6-8]
This subject will be addressed in greater detail later when
I discuss Cuban tactics.
E. LOGISTICAL CAPABILITIES
A major determining factor in any nation's threat
potential is that nation's ability to transport the neces-
sary men and materials to the area of conflict. Even
nations with enormous standing armies such as the People's
Republic of China, North Korea, or Vietnam are unable to
utilize these armies far from their borders due to inade-
quate logistical capabilities.
Cuba, Vietnam and all of the Warsaw Pact members are a
significant distance from prospective areas of conflict in
Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and most of Asia.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies indicates
that the airlift capability of all Soviet surrogate forces
in and out of the Warsaw Pact is inadequate for long-range
power projection missions. The transport aircraft in their
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inventories either lack the range or numbers needed to make
any large intervention possible. [Ref. 26:pp. 31-36]
As mentioned before, Cuba does have an adequate airlift
capability to transport paratroops and light infantry units
into the Caribbean Basin, and a limited resupply capacity
for forces in Africa.
However, in terms of sealift capability, Cuba is capable
of transporting troops, supplies and a limited amount of
heavy equipment to conflict areas with developed port
facilities. Table 11 below shows how Cuba has attempted to
improve its sealift capability since 1977, and how it
compares with other Soviet bloc nations and radical regimes.
TABLE 11
MERCHANT MARINE CAPABILITY OF THE SOVIET ALLIES
NATION NUMBER OF VESSELS GROSS TONNAGE
1977 1985j^ 1977 1985
Cuba 294 418 (16) 603,750 960,993
Bulgaria 179 193 (20) 937,458 1,248,210
Czech 12 19 - 184,266
GDR 437 416 (9) 1,389,000 1,420,000
Hungary 16 21 47,943 81,536
Poland 696 916 (28) 2,817,129 3,650,615
Romania 122 379 (11) 777,309 2,390,764
USSR — 7,713 (489) — 23,788,668
Nicaragua — 20 (2) — 18,604
Vietnam - 114 (11) - 268,733
North Korea - 57 (3) - 438,972
Libya - 104 (17) - 903,821
( )
= Number of oil tankers
Sources: Jane's Fighting Ships 1978-85 , and Jean
Labayle Couhat, ed.. Combat Fleets of the
World 1984/85 . Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, Maryland, 1984
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F. SOVIET FORCES IN CUBA
While not directly under the command of the Cuban
Government, the significant Soviet military presence in Cuba
must be taken into account. Moscow's largest electronic
intelligence collection facility outside of the Soviet Union
is located at Lourdes, Cuba. Approximately 2,400 Soviet
military advisors are in Cuba providing training and
technical assistance. Temporary Soviet naval combatant
deployments to Cuba began as early as July of 1969. This
first deployment included a guided missile cruiser, two
guided missile destroyers, two submarines (one nuclear-
powered)
,
two support ships, one submarine tender, and an
oiler. To date, the Soviets have made 25 similar task force
deployments to Cuba since 1969 [Ref. 29:p. 36]. The Soviets
also maintain two TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft in
Cuba on a continuous basis, thus giving the Soviets a
constant airborne surveillance capability of the Atlantic
and Caribbean. In addition to the advisors and frequent
deployments by Soviet warships, submarines and aircraft, a
3,000-man Soviet brigade is stationed on the island to guard
the Lourdes facility and serve as a deterrent force against
any possible U.S. military action. [Ref. 46:pp. 45-46]
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V. TACTICS
The tactics used by Castro in order to achieve his
revolutionary goals have evolved greatly over the past
quarter-century. Part of this evolutionary change can be
attributed to past Cuban failures, while a large part is due
to Cuba's increased dependence on the Soviet Union. The
relationship between the Soviet Union's strategic objectives
and Cuban tactical decisions is still debated by scholars of
Soviet-Cuban politics. How these two nations divide their
revolutionary responsibilities is obviously a complex and
dynamic matter, which varies depending on the geographical
area, or country, targeted for revolutionary action. Dr.
Jiri Valenta, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere Affairs, claimed that the Soviet-Cuban
alliance was practiced along the following guidelines:
. . . First, the U.S.S.R. does not necessarily seek to
create Leninist regimes at any cost. Second, the Soviet
Union seems, in many instances, to prefer that its allies
(Cuba in Africa and Latin America, Vietnam in Southeast
Asia) "micromanage"—and play a primary role in—the
initial development of new relationships with aspiring
Leninist forces. [Ref. 51:p. 3]
According to Valenta, the Soviets see Cuba's role as a
"junior Soviet partner," who are allowed to use Soviet
military and economic aid to pursue policies which
ultimately benefit, not just Cuban, but Soviet strategic
objectives [Ref. 51:p. 3]. The Cubans are given leeway in
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which to carry out their programs in the Third World,
especially in the Western Hemisphere, where Cuban forces are
less provocative than a large Soviet presence. Cuba has
also shown itself to be more racially, culturally, and
linguistically acceptable to regimes in Latin America and
Africa than their Soviet sponsors. Valenta states:
Finally, the Soviet Union rarely gives explicit instruc-
tions to junior partners. Nor does it assign tactical
missions. Instead, aspiring Leninist leaders in the Third
World are usually at liberty to use their own imagination
(with Cuba often acting as broker) to cultivate ties with
the Soviets and explore basic Soviet strategic objectives
and limits of tolerance. . . . Ultimately, the Soviet
Union aims to reduce Cuba's brokerage role and develop
direct relations with these regimes. This strategy became
apparent in Angola in 1977-78 and may have been a factor
in the internal leadership conflict in Grenada in October
1983 . . . [Ref. 51:pp. 3-4]
Our understanding of the Soviet-Cuban partnership in
promoting revolutionary regimes is not based on mere specu-
lation. Tons of documents signed by Cuban, Soviet, and
Grenadian officials (many marked secret and top secret) were
discovered by U.S. forces during the Grenada operation in
October of 1983. These documents clearly demonstrate the
nature of the Soviet-Cuban relationship in building Leninist
regimes. Cuba's autonomy in developing revolutionary situa-
tions in Latin America (rather than being a pawn for
Moscow's operations) is indicated by the remarks of former
Chief of the Soviet General Staff Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov,
who spoke of the growing numbers of anti-American "progres-
sive" forces in the Caribbean Basin. Orgarkov told his
Grenadian counterpart in early 1983: "Over two decades ago
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there was only Cuba in Latin America; today there are
Nicaragua and Grenada, and a serious battle is going on in
El Salvador." The tone of Orgarkov • s remarks indicate
approval, yet surprise, in the actions and accomplishments
of Cuba and its other "junior partners" in the Western
Hemisphere. [Ref. 51:p. 4]
The fact that the Soviet Union is not the driving force
behind Cuban efforts in the Western Hemisphere is sometimes
lost on U.S. policymakers, who fail to recognize the
tremendous leeway Castro's Cuba has in developing its own
revolutionary strategy. Castro himself stated in a December
1982 speech (reported in the Cuban press) that Cuba is the
spearhead for revolutionary action in the Western Hemis-
phere, not Moscow. Castro gave specific examples of how
this relationship operates in the case of Central America:
One of the great lies that the imperialists use concerning
Central America is their attempt to impute the revolution
in this area to the Soviet Union . . . [The U.S.S.R.] has
had nothing whatsoever to do with Central America. . . .
The Soviets did not know even one of the present leaders
of Nicaragua . . . during the period of revolutionary
struggle. The same holds true for El Salvador . . . with
the exception of the Communist Party of El Salvador— . . .
not one of the major groups—the Soviet Union did not know
the leaders of [most Salvadoran] revolutionary organiza-
tions and had no contact with them. The same goes for
Guatemala. ... We Cubans . . . have relations with the
revolutionary movements, we know the revolutionary leaders
in the area. I am not going to deny it. [Ref. 52 :p. 134]
Having established Cuba's predominate role in organizing
and supporting revolutionary movements in the Caribbean
Basin, and possible in other Third World areas such as
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Africa, we will now look into what criteria and tactics
Havana employs to fulfill its revolutionary agenda.
It appears that Cuba in the 1980s is more selective in
choosing its targets and tactics than ever before. Castro
has learned to use all of Cuba's assets to promote his
revolutionary ideology from propaganda to conventional
military power. With the tacit support of the Soviet Union,
Cuba has attempted to increase its influence in the
Caribbean Basin and other parts of the Third World through a
combination of military and political power.
In the 1960s, the Cuban leadership believed that the
proper conditions for revolution were present throughout
Latin America. In July 1960, Castro boasted that he would
convert "the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra
of Latin America." The strategy developed by the Cubans to
"ignite" this revolutionary time-bomb was called the ' foco
'
theory, which advocated the primacy of the guerrilla nucleus
and struggle. However, the Castro-Guevara foco theory
ignored the objective condition of the target country, and
was extremely naive concerning the chances of gaining
recruits for their peasant armies. Che Guevara's mission
and eventual death in Bolivia in 1967 painfully exposed the
shortcomings of the Cuban revolutionary strategy in the
1960s.
In the 1970s, Cuba concentrated on building up its
conventional armed forces while retaining its ties with the
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remnants of the insurgent and terrorist groups it had
assisted earlier in Latin America. Cuba also nurtured and
expanded its contacts with numerous extremist groups
throughout the world, including former delegates to the 1966
Tricontinental Conference.
Cuba's involvement in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s
provided the FAR with military experience in combat. Havana
also learned how to create local militias to protect
friendly "revolutionary" regimes. By the 1980s, the Cuban
Interventionary Forces had obtained operational experience
in the entire spectrum of conventional and unconventional
warfare: from influence operations in the United States and
Western Europe to large-scale military interventions in
Africa and the Middle East. This background has resulted in
the Cuban government developing highly sophisticated tactics
for its interventionist strategy.
Cuba's departure from advocating revolutionary warfare
in the early 1970s was more a tactical withdrawal than a
total abandonment of the utility of armed struggle. With
the Allende government in power in Chile, Cuba's role s the
Praetorian guard to select regimes in Africa, and the United
States retrenchment after defeat in Vietnam, Castro could
afford a respite from his revolutionary chores. During this
period, which lasted from approximately 1969 to 1973, Castro
attempted to revitalize the Cuban economy and to transform
the Cuban military, with generous Soviet arms and training
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assistance, into the professional armed forces that it is
today. Ironically, as the Cuban military grew in size and
capability, its need at home decreased for the reasons
mentioned above. Both Moscow and Havana were eager to
exercise their new power in light of the United States'
post-Vietnam paralysis. This time Castro was careful to
consult with the Soviet Union, understanding the limits of
his power as well as the possibilities for Cuba if it
cooperated with Moscow.
As mentioned earlier, geography determines what tactics
Havana will use in any intervention, as well as the scope of
the operation. Cuban tactics and initiatives are best seen
in Havana's operations in the Western Hemisphere. In the
Caribbean Basin, Castro has more leeway to decide what
tactics and strategy should be employed.
In this section I will briefly address some of the
tactics used by the Cuban regime to promote revolutionary
struggles, and how Havana defends revolutionary gains after
pro-Cuban governments achieve power. The section is divided
into four parts. First, we will examine the large-scale
military interventions such as the Angola intervention in
1975, the Ethiopia effort in 1977, and the smaller military
operations in the PDRY in 1972 and Syria in 1973-74. The
second part will deal with Cuban efforts to keep select
Marxist-Leninist regimes in power, concentrating on Havana's
allies in the Western Hemisphere such as the Bishop regime
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in Grenada and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The third part
will detail Cuba's new strategy to assist revolutionary
guerrilla and terrorist groups out of power, primarily in
Central America, along with Nicaraguan assistance. The
fourth part will briefly cover Cuba's support for their
latest revolutionary ally, drug traffickers in Central and
South America.
A. LARGE-SCALE MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
The first opportunities for Cuba to exercise its newly
acquired military power occurred in the late 1970s. As
mentioned earlier, while Cuba had been active in Africa
supporting "progressive" regimes throughout the 1960s, Cuban
soldiers were mainly involved in training militia forces
rather than combat operations. The Cuban assistance in the
PDRY and Syria in 1972 and 1974 provided Castro with an
opportunity to test his new forces. Cuba quickly sent
hundreds of advisors to both of these countries to train
their armed forces in the use and maintenance of advance
Soviet military equipment and tactics. These missions
differed greatly from Cuba's earlier African efforts. Not
only were the weapons more sophisticated than the type of
weapons used in earlier Cuban training missions, this time
the Cubans were also working very closely with the Soviets
and even taking part in combat operations. This was the
beginning of what Hosmer and Wolfe call Soviet-Cuban
"cooperative intervention." By late 1977, Cuban advisors
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and combat personnel were active in large-scale combat
operations in Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia (they were later
thrown out when Castro sided with Ethiopia), the PDRY, and
Syria.
Castro's success as a Soviet partner in Africa boosted
Cuba's prestige not only in the Kremlin, but also in the
eyes of a majority of the Third World. By 1979, Castro had
won his bid to become the Chairman of the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM). Not content with Cuba's success in Africa,
Castro turned his attention toward repeating Cuba's success
in the Western Hemisphere. Castro's luck continued in 1979,
when the pro-Cuban New Jewel Movement (NJM) came to power in
a near bloodless cpup on the tiny Caribbean island of
Grenada. In July of the same year, the Sandinistas managed
to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, albeit
with limited Cuban aid. These events shifted Castro's
attention away from Africa, even though tens of thousands of
Cuban troops were still needed in Africa to protect Havana's
revolutionary allies.
Havana's success in its African and Middle Eastern
interventions were the result of Havana's position as a
valued Soviet ally and superclient. Power projection is a
complex, expensive and dangerous operation only attempted on
a large scale by a handful of nations in the world. The
combination of Soviet willingness to supply and support
surrogates in Third World conflicts, and Cuba's ability and
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willingness to operate and maintain advanced Soviet equip-
ment, allows Castro to pursue his maximalist foreign policy
objectives in a form of "cooperative intervention." The
cooperation achieved between the Soviets and Cubans in the
Angolan intervention signaled a maturation of the Soviet-
Cuban relationship. The exercise was repeated on a smaller,
but no less dramatic scale in Ethiopia in 1977. Once the
Soviet Union and Cuba decided that the MPLA in Angola and
the Mengistu Government in Ethiopia were worthy of Soviet-
Cuban assistance, their combined forces were put in motion.
The Soviet Union supplies the arms and some technical
assistance on a level sufficient to guarantee their clients'
survival. This equipment is transported on the Soviet
Union's new airlift and sealift capability. The entire
operation is made possible because of Soviet logistics and
command and control. The Cubans supply the trained manpower
and combat forces. Thus, the Cubans complement the Soviet
command and support effort with thousands of combat troops
which had been trained on Soviet equipment. How the Soviet
Union and Cuba were able to transport tens of thousands of
troops and tons of war material to Angola, Ethiopia, and
other Third World recipients has been detailed by many
scholars over the past decade and will not be repeated
here.
^
^For a detailed study of the Angolan and Ethiopian
interventions see Stephen Hosmer, and Thomas W. Wolfe,
Soviet Policy and Practice Toward Third World Conflicts ,
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However, it is useful to point out a few major points
basic to the success of these operations: First, the
Soviets must supply nearly all of the armaments and logisti-
cal forces for these operations. Second, Cuba is able to
transport thousands of troops, carrying nothing larger than
light infantry weapons, for short-term interventions. For
interventions lasting longer than six months involving more
than a few thousand troops, Cuba must rely on Soviet airlift
and sealift support. The third point critical to the
success of these operations is that both Moscow and Havana
must perceive these interventions to be in both their inter-
ests. In the case of Angola, Havana's relationship with the
MPLA exceeded that of the Soviet Union's in duration and
intensity. Ethiopia was the reverse, but Cuba was able to
justify its presence as in line with the Organization of
African Unity's Charter. (The OAU gave Ethiopia the right
of self-defense from Somalian aggression. The Cubans did
refrain from fighting the northern separatists in Ethiopia,
although it is likely that the Soviets would have wanted
Havana to do so.) Finally, on the battlefield, Cuban
tactics are similar to those of the Soviets, with some
modifications. Soviet tactical doctrine predominates
throughout the Cuban Armed Forces, although the FAR has made
some minor tactical modifications in order to operate in
different geographical and climatic conditions with smaller
Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1983.
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forces than its Soviet counterparts. Because of Cuba's
small size and limited resources, the Cubans try to employ-
guerrilla tactics and maneuver warfare against superior
forces whenever possible. Like their Soviet counterparts,
the Cubans rely heavily on artillery and rocket barrages to
dissolve enemy formations and destroy enemy morale. [Ref.
37:pp. 5-11 to 5-61]
The possibility of another major Soviet-Cuban interven-
tion at the present time seems remote, but cannot be
discounted in the case of South Africa, or any other target
nation where the perceived Soviet-Cuban benefits currently
outweigh risks.
While large-scale military interventions by Cuban troops
in Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean Basin has
received the most media attention over the past decade, they
are just one area in which Cuban forces are actively
pursuing Havana's foreign policy goals. Since Cuba is a
nation with a population smaller than the state of Pennsyl-
vania, it prefers to use less costly and dangerous
strategies and tactics than major military interventions to
influence regional politics and support its revolutionary
allies in power.
B. SUPPORT FOR MARXIST-LENINIST REGIMES
Having helped their revolutionary comrades achieve
power, the Cubans are soon faced with the difficult task of
keeping these regimes in power. As mentioned earlier, for a
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combination of practical and strategic reasons, Havana is
given the basic responsibility for assisting Soviet-Cuban
client states in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. forces
captured a variety of documents in Grenada which provided a
unique insight into the cooperative process between a regime
such as that of Maurice Bishop, their Cuban brokers, and
other revolutionary allies like the Soviet Union, East
Germany, North Korea, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Bulgaria, and
Libya.
The captured Grenada documents illustrate how Cuba
nurtured the Grenadian regime from 1979 until its represen-
tatives were evicted in 1983. First, Cuba increased its
presence on the island with hundreds of Cuban advisors and
technicians. The Cubans then built up the Grenadian
People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) to defend against any
possible countercoup. Cuba signed an agreement with the
Grenadian government to provide light arms and 40 military
advisors. The agreement also provided a number of Grenadian
soldiers with military training in Cuba. This secret Cuban-
Grenadian protocol was to remain in effect until December
31, 1984, thereby allowing the Cuban armed forces to monitor
and control the development of the Grenadian Armed Forces.
Cuba's role as a broker between Grenada and the Soviet Union
was apparent in agreements signed in Havana in 1980 (a year
after the Bishop coup), 1981, and 1982. In these agree-
ments, the Soviet Union, North Korea and other Soviet
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clients promised Grenada over $37.8 million in military
equipment. All of these weapons were to be routed through
Cuba in order to mask their original source. [Ref. 53]
Moreover, Cuban assistance to the Grenadian regime was
more extensive than military aid. Numerous documents were
discovered in which Havana's America Department instructed
the Grenadian security forces and political leadership in
subjects ranging from control of the Grenadian Catholic
Church to strategies it should follow in international
forums like the Socialist International and the Non-Aligned
Movement. [Ref. 3]
It is likely that a similar relationship exists between
the Cuban government and the Sandinista leadership, and it
is probably more extensive due to Nicaragua's size,
position, and greater importance following the loss of
Grenada. In Nicaragua, Havana has assisted the Sandinistas
in setting up their internal security apparatus, expanding
their armed forces
. and instructing the Nicaraguans on how
to manipulate U.S. public opinion. Defectors from the
Sandinista security apparatus have disclosed the level of
Cuban involvement in Nicaraguan military and security
operations. [Ref. 54:pp. 19-29] A brief glance at
Nicaragua's inventory of sophisticated military equipment
(all of which is compatible with Cuban arms) testifies to
the extent of Havana's presence: over 100 T-54/55 and PT-76
tanks, over 100 armored personnel carriers, numerous combat
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helicopters and light aircraft, hundreds of artillery pieces
and multiple rocket launchers, and thousands of light
infantry weapons. Unlike the relatively unsophisticated
weapons in the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army (PRA)
,
most of these weapons require extensive maintenance by
qualified technicians. A large number of Cuban advisors are
also needed in order for the Sandinistas to use these arms
effectively. Most of these weapons were absorbed into
Nicaragua's 62,000 man army since 1980. It is doubtful that
the Sandinista Army could have done so without the aid of
the 3,000 Cuban military advisors in Nicaragua.
C. SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS AND TERRORIST GROUPS
By the late 1970s, Cuba's conventional military forces
became overextended in Africa, the Middle East and (later)
Nicaragua. As a result, Havana, in an attempt to make low
cost revolutionary gains in the Western Hemisphere,
increased its support for terrorism and guerrilla warfare.
It should be noted, however that Cuba's support for low
intensity conflict in the 1980s is much more sophisticated
than its efforts in the 1960s. Havana today is much more
aware of the value of propaganda, proper military training,
and intelligence support.
In December of 1981, the United States' State Department
released a report titled "Cuba's Renewed Support for
Violence in Latin America." The report claimed that Havana
had abandoned its policy of strengthening diplomatic
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relations with governments in the Western Hemisphere, and
had returned to its campaign of the 1960s of promoting armed
insurgency [Ref. 35] The late 1970s did show a dramatic
increase in Cuba's interest in subverting its neighbors.
The Cuban strategic shift back to armed insurgency in the
early 198 0s occurred following the Cuban successes in
conventional military interventions in Angola and Ethiopia,
along with the victories of the Bishop coup in Grenada and
the Sandinistas' in Nicaragua in 1979. These developments
apparently convinced the Cuban leadership of the renewed
viability of the "armed struggle" doctrine, which Havana had
shelved after its failed efforts to overthrow governments in
Latin America in the 1960s. According to the report, Cuban
support for urban and rural insurgency in the 1980s has used
the following tactics:
1. United Traditionally Splintered Radical Groups. After
the setbacks suffered by the Cuban "foco" theory in Latin
America in the 1960s, the Cubans learned to unite various
revolutionary and radical groups. This policy is clearly
stated in Leninist teachings as the best method of
achieving power. For practical reasons the Cubans opted
only to support, through arms, training and advisors,
movements that are capable of putting aside their differ-
ences for a common objective.
2
.
Encourage Terrorism in Order to Provoke Indiscrimin-
ate Violence by Government Security Forces. Drawing from
their own experience in the Cuban Revolution, and from an
understanding of how to manipulate public opinion in the
United States and Europe, the Cubans are promoting terror-
ism in order to incite pro-U.S. regimes to strike back
indiscriminately. Since many of these armies and security
forces are poorly trained and undisciplined, their
counter-terrorist or counter-insurgency efforts sometimes
become focused on the insurgents ' support apparatus rather
than the insurgents themselves. The result is civilian
casualties and death squadron reprisals. Havana is well
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aware of the paralyzing effect this type of violence has
on American policy-making. Havana hopes that by promoting
terrorism in Central American countries allied with the
United States, these target countries will rely on a
heavy-handed counterterrorism effort and increased state
repression, thus alienating U.S. public opinion and making
a coherent bipartisan U.S. policy in Central America more
difficult.
3 . Provide Liaison Assistance to Terrorist/Guerrilla
Groups with Other Radical Regimes (Eastern bloc, Vietnam,
North Korea, Libya, Iran, etc.). Recent experiences in
Grenada and Nicaragua indicate that the Cubans no longer
try to "go it alone" when supporting Marxist regimes or
guerrilla groups. As with its support for radical Marxist
regimes, Havana has set up an elaborate network in which
guerrilla and terrorist groups can tap into the resources
of other Marxist and radical patron nations. In this way
numerous revolutionary groups can receive training, money,
and arms in order to further the scope of their
operations. The role Cuba plays as a "broker" for
guerrilla and terrorist organizations in Central America
is known from numerous documents and weapons captured from
El Salvadoran guerrillas which were traced back to Cuba.
For example, of the 1,550 M-16 rifles captured from El
Salvadoran guerrillas by government forces, 60 percent
were traced back to Vietnam. Captured guerrilla documents
later indicated that these weapons were part of a shipment
of 1,620 M-16S supplied by Vietnam, via Cuba. [Ref. 55:p.
2] Other Soviet bloc nations were also implicated in
assisting Cuba in its support for Central American
insurgent groups.
4. Train Ideologically Committee Cadres in Urban and
Guerrilla Warfare and Tactics. Unlike the 1960s, when the
Cuban armed forces were small and inexperienced, the
modern FAR and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior is
capable of training large numbers of guerrillas, terror-
ists, propaganda experts and political cadres. This
training is not only necessary for the guerrillas to gain
victory on the battlefield, but also allows them to
consolidate power quickly.
5. Provide Military Aid and Assistance to Groups Showing
Signs of Possible Victory and Pro-Cuban Orientation. The
Cubans now understand that there are "many roads to
socialism." All anti-regime organizations can play an
important role in overthrowing the old government and
helping the new government consolidate power. Some of
these organizations were unacceptable to the Cuban revolu-
tionaries of the 1960s, but the new leadership in Havana
now knows how to exploit these groups for its own
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purposes. Some of these groups include the Catholic
church, trade unions and even the military. [Ref. 35:pp.
3-5]
D. COOPERATION WITH DRUG TRAFFICKERS
Cuba's decision to cooperate with powerful Latin
American drug traffickers is probably connected with its
support of South American guerrilla movements. When these
guerrilla movements needed funds to support their operations
in the late 1970s and early 1980s (funds that revolutionary
allies such as Cuba were unable to provide in large
amounts) , they turned to Colombian drug kingpins, who were
expanding their power and operations in response to the
growing U.S. public demand for cocaine and other drugs.
Since Colombia is the nerve center of the Latin American
drug industry, and since Cuban relations with the Colombian
government have never been warm, Havana must have seen this
as a unique opportunity to gain hard currency and increase
its influence with the Colombia guerrilla groups, while at
the at the same time contributing to the demise of the
United States.
One of the Colombian drug dealers Cuba assisted was
Jaime Guillot-Lara. Besides being a well-known drug and
arms trafficker, Guillot is also a close personal friend of
the leader of the M-19 guerrilla group, Jaime Bateman.
Guillot was introduced to Cuban officials in Colombia in
late 1979 by another drug and arms smuggler, Juan "Johnny"
Crump. According to U.S. Congressional testimony in April
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of 1983, Guillot and the Cuban officials discussed the use
of Cuban waters as an intermediate safehaven on their way
into South Florida. Guillot met again with Cuban officials
in July 1980. This time the Cuban delegation included Rene
Rodriguez-Cruz, a member of the Central Committee of the
Cuban Communist Party and President of the Cuban Institute
of Friendship to the People (ICAP) . An agreement was
reached in which Cuba would pay Guillot for weapons
purchased in Miami and smuggled to the M-19 in Colombia on
his return voyages. [Ref. 56:pp. 82-83]
During 1980 and 1981, Guillot moved tremendous amounts
of drugs to the Cuban port of Paredon Grande, where they
were transferred to smaller vessels on their way to South
Florida. According to the testimony of former drug dealer
and DGI agent Mario Estebes, some of the dealers receiving
these drugs in Florida are DGI agents smuggled into the
United States during the Mariel boatlift of 1980 [Ref. 41:p.
27]. While Guillot's ships were in Cuban waters, they were
protected by Cuban gunboats under the direct orders of Vice
Admiral Aldo Santamaria-Cuadrado of the Cuban Navy. [Ref.
56:pp. 82-83]
In November 1981, the Colombian Navy sank one of
Guillot's boats, the Katrina, and seized another, the
Monarca . The Katrina was returning to Colombia from the
United States with 100 tons of weapons and ammunition for
the M-19 guerrillas. Guillot was arrested in Mexico, but
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was later released after extradition requests for him from
both the United States and Colombia were rejected. U.S.
officials were told that Guillot had considered taking
refugee in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City prior to his
arrest. According to a U.S. State Department report, Fidel
Castro instructed the Cuban Embassy to protect Guillot.
[Ref. 57]
Following Guillot 's release, the United States indicated
him and 13 others on drug smuggling charges. Among the 13
were four top Cuban officials, including Vice Admiral Aldo
Santamaria and Fernando Ravelo, former Cuban ambassador to
Colombia. during a Congressional investigation into the
matter, Senator Jeremiah Denton, Republican of Alabama,
asked convicted drug dealer Juan Crump if these Cuban
officials could have been acting on their own without the
knowledge of the Cuban government. Crump replied:
For sure it was an action of the Cuban government. Ravelo
is an honest man in his own way, he would never do
something like that for his own benefit. That means the
Cuban government was involved in the thing, it was not
personal. [Ref. 56:pp. 84-85]
Another confessed drug smuggler, David Perez, said he
had "no doubt the whole Cuban government was very much aware
of what we were doing" when his boats were escorted into a
Cuban harbor by navy torpedo boats to onload a huge supply
of qualude tablets. Perez and his crew dumped the tablets
when they were spotted by a U.S. Coast Guard cutter. If he
would have sold the shipment in Florida, one-third of his
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estimated $5 million profit would have gone to his Cuban
contacts. [Ref. 56:pp. 82-83]
The full extent of official Cuban involvement cannot be
discussed on the unclassified level. However, with the
limited public information already known, it appears that
Havana has decided to play an active role in the multi-
billion dollar drug trade. With an estimated 3,000 DGI
agents already in the United States, an extensive intelli-
gence apparatus in place throughout Latin America, and
active ties to guerrilla movements in the region, Cuba is in
an excellent position to assist in drug smuggling.
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VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE CUBAN THREAT TO UNITED STATES
SECURITY INTERESTS
Cuba's geographic location, its growing military power,
and close relationship with the Soviet Union, when combined
with its proven hostility toward the United States, presents
an increasing threat to United States' strategic and
regional security. Cuba's ideological background and
strategic location, in addition to its historical and
cultural ties to Latin America, allows it to challenge the
United States on both the East-West and North-South axis.
Castro's East-West challenge to the United States comes from
his military cooperation with the Soviet Union. This is
achieved by augmenting Soviet forces in the Caribbean Basin,
and permitting Soviet ships, aircraft, troops, and intelli-
gence facilities strategic access to Cuban bases.
Castro is also able to challenge the United States'
primacy in the Western Hemisphere by advocating a radical
North-South policy against U.S. interests in Latin America.
By being the self-proclaimed champion of Latin American
interests and historical antipathy toward United States'
power in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba has managed to gain
influence in regional affairs and conflicts. Castro has
very skillfully manipulated Cuba's conflicts with the United
States in a way that maximizes Cuba's benefits while mini-
mizing its costs and risks. For example, in the Caribbean
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Basin today, revolutionary Cuba has not only managed to
survive, it has also managed to raise the costs for the
United States in keeping the Caribbean Basin and Latin
America secure.
Cuba's power projection threat to United States and NATO
security interests exists on three separate levels: strate-
gic, regional, and against Third World allies of the U.S.
outside of the Caribbean Basin and NATO's area of responsi-
bility. To date, most of Cuba's military interventions have
occurred in the third, and least threatening category. While
the Horn of Africa and southwest Africa are important
strategic areas, their value is peripheral to U.S. security
interests in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, or North Atlantic
littoral areas. For that reason, this section will concen-
trate on the Cuban threat to the strategic and regional
security of the United States, NATO, and our Latin American
allies,
A. THE STRATEGIC THREAT
Only recently has the Caribbean Basin been recognized as
an areas where a strategic threat to the United States', and
NATO's, security exists. The Cuban Revolution, followed by
the Cuban Missile crisis, had a sobering effect on the
United States, which long considered the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans as formidable barriers against external
enemies. This perception has not only proven naive, but
twice in this century has led to an inadequate defense
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policy which jeopardized our resupply efforts in support of
allies and our own military forces in Europe. Even with the
tremendous advance of military technology since the end of
World War II, or perhaps as a result of these advances,
Caribbean security remains a serious problem for our NATO
commitment and inter-American regional security.
Over the last twenty years, the Cuban military has
developed into a serious threat, and the presence of Soviet
submarines, surface ships and long-range aircraft has
greatly complicated military calculations on our once docile
southern flank. Nor is the Soviet-Cuban military presence
in the Caribbean solely a U.S. problem. NATO's survival
depends heavily on unrestricted transit through the Carib-
bean Sea in times of conflict with the Warsaw Pact. Cuba's
increasing capability to harass shipping in the Caribbean
makes NATO's policy of limiting the Alliance's area of
responsibility (politically sound during the days of
decolonization) obsolete, and forces NATO's strategic
planners to revise its military strategy in order to main-
tain credibility.
In order to recognize fully the strategic threat that
Soviet/Cuban forces in the Caribbean pose to United States
'
and NATO's security interests, one must view these threats
within a certain context. This thesis makes the following
two assumptions.
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First, the United States possesses the advantage in both
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the Caribbean,
especially with regard to the Cuban threat. The scenarios
in which Cuba could pose a serious challenge to our inter-
ests would be in a regional or cross-oceanic conflict where
nuclear escalation would be unwise politically, or where the
danger of tactical nuclear weapons leading to a global
escalation discourage their use. The United States and NATO
must deal with the security threat in the Caribbean with a
proportional conventional force, rather than relying an
overwhelming nuclear superiority. This limitation has not
been lost on the officials responsible for implementing
NATO's strategy; as Admiral Wesley McDonald, former US
Commander-in-Chief Atlantic, points out, this strategy:
. . . is based on credible deterrence while ensuring an
associated war fighting capability on the European
continent. The validity of this strategy depends directly
on our ability to move large quantities of reinforcement
and resupply material across the Atlantic Ocean, to deploy
naval forces in support of land and air forces in Europe,
and to defend other areas vital to the Alliance. [Ref.
16:p. 1109]
Secondly, the Gulf ports of the United States must be
viewed as a continuation of the U.S. eastern seaboard.
Caribbean security is tied to our ability to have free
access to those ports. The major resupply and reinforcement
route to NATO in time of war originates in the Gulf ports
and transits north along the east coast before being con-
voyed across the Atlantic to Europe. The Germans, in the
two world wars, understood the vulnerability of this long
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life-line and the problems that patrolling thousands of
miles of coastline entailed for the United States.
Specifically, the U-boats could attack shipping at any point
while the United States had to protect the entire area with
limited resources (see Figure 1) . When viewed in this
context, Caribbean security becomes a much greater task than
simply conducting bilateral relations between the United
States and its small neighbors in the Caribbean.
The importance of the Caribbean to United States
security was observed by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan even
before the Spanish-American War. Writing in Harper'
s
Monthly in October 1897, Mahan noted the similarities
between the Caribbean and the Mediterranean:
. . . their conspicuous characteristics now are their
political and military importance, in the broadest sense,
as concerning not only the countries that border them, but
the world at large . . . [Ref. 58]
Despite Admiral Mahan 's warnings, the United States has
historically been unprepared for European challenges in the
Caribbean, especially by Germany's submarines in the two
world wars. In World War I, as Barbara Tuchman points out
in her book The Zimmermann Telegram , Germany decided to
unleash its U-boats in an unrestricted warfare campaign that
would divert America ' s power away from the European
conflict. From early 1917 until the end of the War,
Germany's strategy was to weaken the Allies by cutting off,
at the source, America's supply of war materials to Britain
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Figure 1. Strategic Importance of the Caribbean to
NATO (60% of Total Resupply/Reinforcement
Material in the First 60 Days Sails from
Gulf Ports Through the Florida Straits)
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into a war with Mexico or Japan, or preferably both. [Ref.
59:p. 66]
Perhaps the most profound observation of the impact that
World War I had on United States security in the Western
Hemisphere was made by Lieutenant Frederick Korner. Lieu-
tenant Korner was one of the officers on board U-151, which
was the first U-boat sent to raid allied shipping on
America's Atlantic coast. While covering 10,915 miles in 94
days, his U-boat sank 23 ships totaling 61,000 tons. U-151
was also responsible for the sinking of four other merchant
ships caught in the mine fields it had laid in the Chesa-
peake and Delaware Bays. Lieutenant Korner commented upon
his return to Germany on July 20, 1918:
. . . we had shown a skeptical world that even the wide
expanse of the Atlantic was not enough to keep us from a
superraid to the coast of far-off America. Surely this is
a warning of what later wars may bring. For the day will
come when submarines will think no more of a voyage across
the Atlantic than they do now of a raid across the North
Sea. America's isolation is now a thing of the past.
[Ref. 60:p. 68]
The Caribbean Basin's strategic importance, and the
United States' concern whether it could safeguard the area,
again became an issue prior to World War II. The fear of
German influence in the Caribbean was paramount in American
war planning before the Second World War. At the time of
the fall of France in 1940, public opinion polls showed that
two-thirds of the American public supported direct military
intervention in Latin America to forestall any German
threat. [Ref. 61:p. 167] The United States then possessed
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bases in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal Zone. Even
with this concern, the U.S. failed to learn from its World
War I experience and again allowed the German U-boats to
wreak havoc on shipping off of its East Coast and the
Caribbean during the early years of the Second World War.
American officials were worried by the Axis threat to the
Caribbean region, especially in countries with large German
populations. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, an
attack on the Panama Canal by Japanese carrier-based air-
craft and amphibious forces also seem a possibility. In
December of 1941, following the Japanese and German declara-
tions of war, reinforcements were quickly dispatched to
Caribbean bases. The number of air and ground personnel
sent in that month was double the number assigned to the
area in the previous eleven months. In one year, the
Caribbean Defense Command reached a total of 119,000 men,
with half of them stationed in Panama. [Ref. 61 :p. 177]
Three days before Germany declared war on the United
States, Admiral Karl Donitz, head of the U-boat command, was
told that all restrictions against sinking American ships
were lifted. German U-boats were also authorized to sink
allied shipping in American waters. Donitz requested a
dozen U-boats to take advantage of the ill-prepared
Americans. He received six, of which only five were opera-
tional at the moment. The first group was sent to the
northeast U.S. coastline, where they sank numerous U.S.
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merchant ships. In February, six more U-boats were ready
for dispatch to America. Donitz correctly assumed that the
Americans would be concentrating their limited anti-
submarine forces to the north, where his first five
submarines had inflicted heavy damage on U.S. and allied
shipping with the loss of only a single submarine. This
time Donitz sent his submarines to the Caribbean. By the
end of March, Donitz 's eleven U-boats had sunk 79 ships in
Caribbean, Canadian and U.S. waters. At the end of April,
Donitz claimed to have sunk 198 ships in American waters
while losing only one U-boat. [Ref. 62:pp. 40-135]
Despite being thousands of miles from their support
bases in occupied France, and though confronted by the
threat of unopposed hostile air forces, the Germans U-boats
managed to inflict substantial damage on the Allies in the
Caribbean with only a minor investment of resources. The
total number of ships sunk by the end of 1942 climbed to a
staggering 336 ships, equaling 1.5 million tons (see Figure
2). In 1943, anti-submarine patrols, and a decline in U-
boat activity due to events on the other side of the
Atlantic, sharply reduced shipping losses in the Caribbean;
to 35 ships in 1943 and only 3 in 1944. [Ref. 61:p. 178]
The only German submarine capable of the mission at the
time was the Type VII. This submarine carried enough fuel
for a six-week voyage, fourteen torpedoes and deck guns, and
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information is important when we consider the enhanced capa-
bility of the Cuban and Soviet diesel submarines, not to
mention the soviet nuclear attack submarines. [Ref. 62 :p.
209]
Nor was the strategic threat to the United States during
World War II limited to submarine warfare. The Germans had
such contempt for America's ability to guard its own coast
that, in June of 1942, they decided to land eight saboteurs
on the U.S. mainland—four in New York and four in south
Florida. (This attempt has been later referred to as the
Amagansett Incident because the first group was delivered by
U-boat to Amagansett, Long Island.) The attempt failed
because a member of the group, a German-born American
citizen caught in Germany during the War, betrayed the
others. Nonetheless, the group had managed to bring enough
money and explosives with them to engage in sabotage opera-
tions for two years. [Ref. 62:pp. 254-266]
The U-boat contribution to the overall German war effort
during the two world wars was immense. In the First World
War, the Germans managed to sink 4,837 ships (11 million
tons) . In World War II, the number of ships decreased to
2,828, but the tonnage increased to 14.5 million tons.
[Ref. 60 :p. 164] These historical figures should cause
alarm to anyone who dismisses the present-day submarine
threat as insignificant. It also points out the continuing
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trend of fewer and larger ships being used to transport
important resources such as crude oil and other strategic
minerals. Today, a few hundred ships lost to submarines,
mines or aircraft could cripple an allied war effort.
One must also realize that the U-boat threat was even-
tually countered in part by unopposed anti-submarine air-
craft flying out of bases in friendly Caribbean countries,
most notably Cuba. Today, Cuba is a hostile country which
would not only deny the U.S. base rights, but could also be
a source of fighter-bomber aircraft capable of threatening
our anti-submarine aircraft, surface ships, and allied
merchant shipping (see Figure 3).
These historical lessons have not been lost on the
Soviet Navy. When confronted with the fact that NATO had
450 to 500 destroyers, frigates and corvettes available to
safeguard merchant shipping in time of war. Admiral
Gorshkov, the former Commander of the Soviet Navy, pointed
out that 2,500 to 3,000 escorts were deployed in the Atlan-
tic in 194 3 to oppose about 210 operational German U-boats.
Today the Soviet Navy has 180 attack submarines of which 4
percent are nuclear powered. The Soviets also have little
need to protect the sea lanes for their own merchant ships
in time of war, since they are self-sufficient in strategic
minerals and supplies. [Ref. 63 :p. 52]
In the 1980s, unlike in the past when the United States
needed only to be concerned about the military forces of
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M.G 23 Hadiut
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military
Power Fourth Edition . 1985, p. 120
Figure 3. Strategic Implications of MIG Aircraft Based
in Cuba and Nicaragua (Combat Radius of MIG-
21 and MIG-23 Aircraft)
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far-off Germany and Japan, the United States faces a hostile
government with considerable military strength less than 90
miles from the Florida coast. Even more worrisome, Cuba's
geographic position now provides a friendly base for Soviet
military aircraft, ships, and submarines. Most importantly,
it supports the largest and most elaborate Soviet intelli-
gence collection and analysis facility outside of the Soviet
Union. The Lourdes installation near Havana would greatly
enhance the Soviet's ability to locate and track U.S. naval
combatants and merchant ships in the Caribbean. Soviet, or
Cuban, submarines could then attack these targets at a time
and place of their choosing.
In terms of conventional island defense, limited offen-
sive operations, and extensive intelligence and sabotage
operations, Fidel Castro has transformed Cuba into the
strongest nation in Latin America.
The Soviets must realize the strategic importance of the
Caribbean from studies of the two world wars. To Soviet
planners, the Caribbean is an area in which they can tie
down American strength with only a minimal investment of
resources, in a manner similar to Germany's strategy forty
years earlier.
For their part, the Cuban Armed Forces are continuing
their arms build-up of Soviet weapons at a faster rate than
any Warsaw Pact member [Ref. 28:p. 354]. And despite the
setback of losing Grenada's international airport in 1983,
132
the infrastructure in Cuba and Nicaragua will continue to
provide Cuban, Nicaraguan and Soviet air and naval assets
with excellent operating facilities throughout the Caribbean
Basin.
The combination of Soviet and Cuban assets in the
Caribbean greatly complicates U.S. supply efforts to NATO
allies in times of crisis or conflict. NATO forces must
keep the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) open in order to
sufficiently resupply allied forces in Europe. Many of the
major U.S. Army units which are destined for NATO are
located in the central U.S. with insufficient rail transport
to take them to the eastern seaboard. Their only practical
route is by rail or ship south towards the Gulf ports.
The map below indicates the location of major Army bases
in the central United States. Obviously, components of
NATO's strategy needs to be revised if naval convoys are
expected to travel to Gulf ports, successfully transit the
Caribbean with only a limited number of armed escorts, and
then attempt to run a gauntlet of Soviet submarines in the
Atlantic Ocean in time of war (see Figure 4)
.
In 1983, the United States Navy conducted a large-scale
exercise in the Caribbean to test our ability to meet these
requirements. The force totaled 4 3 warships and prompted
Captain John E. Moore, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships , to
comment that the exercise stretched the U.S. Navy assets
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have enough ships; NATO does not have enough ships." [Ref.
64:p. 5]
A combination of Soviet and Cuban submarine assets in
the Caribbean prior to the outbreak of hostilities would
pose a serious ASW problem to the U.S. Navy's already
limited resources, at a time when they may be needed
elsewhere in the Atlantic.
Soviet deployment of some anti-SLOC submarines closer to
the U.S. shoreline v/ould oblige the United States to pull
back its antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces from Europe
and tie them down on the Eastern shore and in the
Caribbean, giving the Soviets a freer rein in the European
theater. [Ref. 65:p. 186]
It is at this level that our NATO allies may be able to
fill the gap on either side of the Atlantic. Through NATO
augmentation of ASW assets in the Caribbean, or by freeing
U.S. assets in the North Atlantic, the United States would
be able to dedicate more ASW capable ships in searching for
Soviet/Cuban submarines in the Caribbean. The Soviet Union
already challenges our critical east coast and Caribbean
shipping lanes. The Soviets regularly deploy modern attack
submarines to those areas, especially the U.S. east coast.
For example, a VICTOR-class nuclear-powered attack submarine
(SSN) , experiencing propulsion problems off of the coast of
Florida, surfaced, and was eventually towed to Cuba for
repairs by a Soviet auxiliary unit in early 1984.
The growing Soviet-Cuban military challenge in the
Caribbean Basin must force NATO to update its strategy of
the 1950s in order to meet the realities of the 1980s. Some
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NATO members, other than the United States, understand the
challenge that a global Soviet presence presents to NATO,
and advocate a more active role for the Alliance outside of
NATO's traditional boundaries. For example, Geoffrey E.
Pattie, a Conservative Member of Parliament, wrote in 1984:
. . . the tides of global events since 1949, along with
the expanding outreach of Soviet conflict strategy, have
thrown into sharper relief the intertwined nature of those
strategic, economic and political interests within a
heightened potential of proliferating conflict. The least
that is incumbent upon the Alliance is a greatly improved
consultative process—one that also features tightened
interaction among the relevant components of the member
governments. The process, however, has to be a two-way
street: while those NATO members with the ability to act
in specific circumstances abroad must shoulder the respon-
sibility of consulting their allies to the maximum extent
practicable, the latter cannot then stand apart with the
pretense that the given action has nothing to do with them
. . . [Ref. 66:p. 39]
The above statement is especially timely as the Reagan
Administration tries to convince other NATO members of the
threat posed by Nicaragua's military and political alliance
with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The United States' policy
of placing increased pressure on the Sandinista government
is designed to reduce Nicaragua's military ties with the
Soviets and Cubans. As such, it is an effort to prevent the
already serious Soviet-Cuban threat from spreading to other
parts of Central America and South America. While the
current strategy may be open for debate, NATO must under-
stand that limiting the Sandinista/Cuban/Soviet build-up in
Nicaragua is in NATO's long-term interest. Some members of
NATO have actually taken concrete measures to improve NATO's
136
security in the Caribbean. In November 1984, a West German
frigate, two Dutch combatants, and a British and Canadian
ship participated with twenty-five U.S. warships in the
Composite Training Unit Exercise 1-85 off the coast of
Puerto Rico [Ref. 67].
NATO strategists must appreciate the incremental threat
that a hostile Cuba, with Soviet support, presents to United
States and NATO security interests in the Caribbean.
Summarizing the potential strategic threats posed by a
strong Soviet-Cuban presence in the Caribbean Basin, the
following are of primary concern to U.S. and NATO
policymakers
:
1. Hostile Intelligence. Besides Moscow operating in
Cuba the largest electronic intelligence collection
facility outside of the Soviet Union, we must assume that
both the KGB and the DGI have networks of agents in the
United States to report on the movement of U.S. military
forces and/or merchant shipping. Our resupply efforts to
NATO would be jeopardized if Soviet and Cuban submarines
were aware of the location of our merchant and naval
forces, and their operating schedules.
2. Surface, Air, and Submarine Warfare. The Cuban Navy
and Air Force, combined with Soviet submarines, long-range
aircraft, and deployed surface ships have the ability to
harass merchant shipping and, if opposed by the American
Navy and Air Force, these Soviet and Cuban forces could
tie down anti-surface and anti-submarine assets many times
their strength, assets which will be sorely needed in the
North Atlantic.
3. Mine Warfare. In addition to the U-boat sinkings, the
Germans were able to inflict serious damage on allied
shipping through the use of mines. Even the American
coast was mined by the German submarines in both world
wars despite the great distances the German U-boats had to
travel. A credible threat of mine warfare would cause a
logjam of American merchant shipping. Many insurance
companies would either raise their rates or refuse to
insure ships travelling through minefields, which would be
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a major factor on the United States' ability to resupply
forces in a crisis situation short of full-scale war. The
present tensions with Libya and Iran could involve such a
resupply scenario. Today, the Soviet inventory of sea
mines is well over the half-million mark. Considering the
capability that Soviet nuclear and conventional submarines
have to lay mines along the U.S. east coast and Caribbean,
and our given inability to quickly and effectively sweep
these sophisticated weapons, mine warfare must be
considered as a serious threat. The offensive and defen-
sive mine warfare capability of the Cuban Navy increases
Castro's ability to assist Soviet mining operations,
especially with its three new diesel attack submarines.
4. Sabotage and Unconventional Warfare. There are numer-
ous high-value targets in the Caribbean such as oil plat-
forms and terminals, communication relay stations, port
facilities and even the Panama Canal. These targets could
easily be damaged or destroyed by small groups of sabo-
teurs or guerrillas. In El Salvador alone, small guerril-
la forces have caused over $1 billion in damage in the
past five years [Ref. 54:p. 33]. During a major conflict,
it is unlikely that the United States would have suffi-
cient forces to guard all of these targets from attack.
The unknown factor in any assessment of the Cuban/Soviet
strategic threat is obviously the likely behavior of the
Cuban government during periods in which direct American
military intervention is likely. Castro's options range
from open belligerency against the U.S. to switching sides.
Admiral McDonald states that the complexity of the decision-
making apparatus in Cuba, particularly Castro's sometimes
irrational behavior, forces NATO to consider the worst case
scenario. [Ref. 16:p. 1110]
Sophisticated hostile forces on Cuba, located in the
middle of our vital shipping lanes, pose a serious threat to
NATO as well as to U.S. security interests. Presently, we
do not have enough resources to deal with a Caribbean threat
while simultaneously fighting a European war. This
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situation will get even worse if Nicaraguan airfields and
ports become operational for Soviet/ Cuban forces. NATO's
Caribbean strategists must learn the historical lessons of
the last two world wars, while dealing with our present-day
threats to this region.
NATO and the United States need to come to a consensus
with regard to an adequate defense policy in the Caribbean
Basin, in peacetime and in war, with a possible formal com-
mitment to defend NATO's interests in that region if they
should become threatened. Such an announcement by NATO
would likely cause the Soviets and Cubans to reevaluate
their position and possibilities in the Caribbean,
specifically in Nicaragua and Central America. A joint
policy would allow for a more comprehensive strategy towards
deploying NATO's air, naval and land-based assets, and sim-
plify command and control in what is now considered a
peripheral zone of NATO's responsibility. It would also
improve coordination and sharing of U.S. and European
intelligence data, thus making infiltration, sabotage and
terrorist operations more difficult for Spetznaz, KGB and
DGI personnel.
How successful NATO is in dealing with the out-of-area
threats will determine the viability of the Alliance into
the next century. As William T. Tow states:
NATO's ultimate survival may well rest on the Europeans'
future inclinations for moving beyond parochial reliance
on strict constructionists rationales and stale policy
ambiguities to search for more enlightened, if more risky,
139
incentives for security cooperation with the United
States. . . [Ref. 68:p. 356]
In conjunction with local Soviet forces, the Cuban
threat to United States and NATO's security interests is a
major challenge to the United States. Cuba's ability to
incite and facilitate regional conflict also represents a
threat to the United States and her regional allies. This
is even more difficult to deal with because of its indigen-
ous and complex nature, and the inability of United States
policy makers to even recognize the problem, let alone to
arrive at a consensus for dealing with it over the long
term. A closer look at Cuba's regional agenda and efforts
in the Caribbean Basin is useful in order to understand the
enormity of Castro's challenge to United States security
interests over the next decade.
B. THE REGIONAL THREAT
Cuba's ability to threaten regional stability far
exceeds its military, economic and political resources. To
compensate for its lack of resources, Cuba has used the
massive social-economic problems in Latin America for
political advantage since the early days of the Cuban
Revolution. Through clever manipulation and propaganda,
Havana has successfully made inroads into Latin America by
claiming that the United States is responsible for many of
the region's problems. In order to turn the propaganda war
into a guerrilla war, Castro has recruited an unusual
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assortment of allies in the Caribbean Basin and South
America. As we have seen, members of this alliance include
nationalists, Marxist guerrillas, terrorist groups, libera-
tion theologians, drug traffickers and any other group or
individual willing to support Cuba's strategy. While many
individuals and countries have clearly rejected Castro's
call to arms, the Cubans have succeeded in a few areas over
the past decade.
Since 1979, with the Sandinistas' victory in Nicaragua
and the Bishop coup in Grenada, Cuba has been able to expand
its military presence into areas within the United States'
regional security zone. While Castro's commitment to these
countries may seem small at first glance, it represents a
major challenge to regional stability. For example, Soviet
bloc arms transfers to Nicaragua have made that country a
major military power by Central American standards (see
Figure 5) . The Sandinista Armed Forces, while presently
lacking large numbers of sophisticated aircraft, could even-
tually augment Cuban forces in the region. It is believed
that a number of MIGs in Cuba are actually Soviet transfers
to Nicaragua awaiting the proper political climate for re-
transfer to Managua [Ref. 69]. The increase in Nicaragua's
military power, in addition to Central American insurgencies
backed by Cuba and Nicaragua, has spawned a regional arms
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Figure 5. Soviet-Bloc Arms Deliveries to Nicaragua
1980-1984 (in metric tons)
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has in turn further complicated the social-economic and
political problems at the root of the region's troubles.
Havana's challenge to United States' security interests
is much more serious than Cuba's small gains in the Carib-
bean Basin would normally warrant. As the authors of one
recent assessment of the Cuban regional threat indicate:
. . . the projection of power involves the creation of a
system, the whole of which is greater than the sum of its
parts. The creation of alternative staging posts, "coal-
ing stations," and intelligence outposts multiplies lever-
age, both military and political. A sub-system of the
Soviet system in the Caribbean has vastly greater implica-
tions than implied by the cumulation of assets created.
Thus it may be congenial to Soviet objectives to have
bases in Cuba from which to harass and encroach upon the
United States. But were Nicaragua to become as much
integrated into the Soviet system as Cuba, not only would
there be a multiplication of Soviet influence and oppor-
tunities, but presumably of Cuba's too. It is this which
explains why the elimination of Cuban and Soviet influence
in Grenada was correctly seen in Washington as more impor-
tant than the minuscule size of Grenada would suggest.
[Ref. 70:p. 20]
Obviously, Cuba's regional strategy suffered a serious
setback with the loss of Grenada in 1983. The new inter-
national airport in Grenada would have been a major asset in
Castro's regional and global interventionist policy. The
airport would have allowed Cuban troops, advisors and
material to transit directly to Africa without the need to
refuel in "hostile" or "non-socialist" countries. The
airport would have also made it easier for radical regimes
such as Libya to support Cuba and its clients with war
material from the Middle East and the Soviet Bloc, by
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allowing these regimes to transport arms to Latin America
without declaring its cargo enroute at "Western" airports.
The captured Grenada documents confirmed that equipment
supplied to the Bishop regime was provided by the Soviets,
East Germans and North Koreans by formal bi-lateral agree-
ments. Cuba's role was merely that of an agent responsible
for re-transferring the equipment to mask its original
source. [Ref. 3:p. 6] The Cubans did, however, sign agree-
ments to provide training for Grenadian soldiers, and assist
the Marxist leaders of Grenada in finding additional train-
ing programs in Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Libya, East Germany
and North Korea. [Ref. 3: p. 7] Hence, the loss of Grenada
not only cost Cuba a valuable ally in the Caribbean, it also
damaged Cuba's image as a regional power.
Prior to the Grenada action, there were indications that
Cuba's influence in the Caribbean was on the decline.
Public opinion polls conducted in Central America showed
that most people believed that Cuba was dominated by the
Soviet Union and a threat to peace in the region. [Ref.
54 :p. 37] In Jamaica's 1980 election campaign, over 500
people were killed in pre-election violence. Many of the
weapons used in the attacks were believed to be from
stockpiles in the Cuban embassy. [Ref. 35 :p. 9]
After Edward Seaga defeated Michael Manley's pro-Cuban
party in the election, the Cuban embassy staff was reduced




government [Ref. 35:p. 11]. Following the violence in
Grenada and the discovery of extensive Cuban and Eastern
bloc power and influence on that tiny island, many Caribbean
Basin nations quickly moved to reduce the number of Cuban
personnel in their own countries [Ref. 71:p. 11].
Havana operates within certain parameters in an effort
to avoid direct military conflict with the United States.
Cuba's location, only 90 miles from the U.S., is a double-
edged sword. While it allows Cuba to threaten U.S.
security, it also facilitates retaliation should Cuba vio-
late the limits of U.S. patience. Castro, remembering the
outcome of the Cuban Missile crisis, cannot rely on Soviet
assistance in a Cuban-United States conflict should he
provoke Washington. Moscow realizes the inherent limita-
tions of the Cuban armed forces, even as an interventionary
force in Africa, should they confront a modern well-equipped
foe such as the South Africans. The Cuban defeat in Grenada
highlights the limits of Cuban power. Rose E. Gottemoeller
describes the Cuban value to the Soviet Union's Third World
strategy in the following terms:
The leverage that the Cubans can gain from their
relationship with the Soviet Union, however, is limited.
The Angolan conflict provided the important example of
Cuban failures against the South Africans. While Cuban
successes speak well for the military prowess of the
Warsaw Pact, defeats against troops carrying advanced
Western weapons have the opposite effect.
Based on the Angola experience, the Soviets may
perceive the Cubans to be of limited usefulness in any
venture where advanced Western military technology and
tactics are likely to play a role. Such Soviet
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perceptions may in turn lead to controls on Cuban attempts
to pursue its own objectives in the Third World. [Ref.
2:p. 17]
This also explains, in part, why the Soviets provide the
Cuban armed forces only limited airlift and sealift
resources.
Yet, the Cuban armed forces, despite their limitations,
are a formidable adversary. Most Western nations have not
been involved in combat operations since the Second World
War. It would be foolish to underestimate the FAR's
improvement and combat experience over the last two decades.
The Cubans are especially adept at fighting in low-intensity
conflicts. In these types of confrontations, modern techno-
logical firepower provides only marginal advantages, with
the U.S. experience in Vietnam providing a prime example.
On the other end of the warfare spectrum, Cuban espion-
age, disinformation, and support for drug traffickers could
pose a serious challenge to Latin American governments
allied with the United States, and the United States itself.
The theft of advance technology and military secrets from
the U.S. is only surpassed by the enormous quantities of
illegal drugs entering the country. The political leader-
ship of countries such as Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and most
importantly for U.S. security, Panama and Mexico, is being
challenged by the $50 billion-a-year drug-related industries
in those countries. The costs to the United States'
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government in fighting this nation's drug problem is
staggering, and is likely to rise over the next decade.
Cuba's growing military power and institutional outreach
programs in the Caribbean Basin has taken the United States
almost by surprise. Western strategic planners must also
take into consideration the incremental nature of the Cuban
threat when determining the defense requirements for the
Caribbean Basin and NATO resupply over the next fifteen
years, into the year 2000.
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VII. PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE CUBA INTERVENTIONS
We have seen Castro's worldwide commitment in support of
revolution and revolutionary regimes in Africa, the Middle
East and the Caribbean Basin. Presently, Cuba has over
35,000 combat troops supporting friendly regimes in the
Third World. Many of these troops are actually involved in
fighting, while others are subjected to harsh living
conditions and disease in the interest of Cuban and Soviet
"proletarian internationalism." The prospects of these
forces returning to Cuba in the near future appears
extremely remote. The Cuban forces in Angola will continue
to support the Marxist MPLA government in their civil war
against the powerful UNITA guerrillas, a war which is now in
its twelfth year. The Cuban forces in Nicaragua must build
up the Sandinista armed forces while fighting with these
same troops against the Honduran-based Contra insurgents.
Castro believes he must also keep a large number of Cuban
troops in Nicaragua to act as a deterrent to any possible
U.S. military action against the Sandinista regime. In
Ethiopia, the number of Cuban military advisors has
decreased from a high of 15,000 to less than 3,000.
However, training the Ethiopian Armed Forces to maintain
large quantities of sophisticated Soviet military hardware,
and fight a variety of insurgencies, will likely require
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Cuba to maintain a significant military presence in that
country for many years to come. The effects of the bloody
civil war that broke out the spring of 1986 in the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen are still unknown. However, it
is probable that rebuilding the armed forces of that Soviet
client will also tax the Cuban Expeditionary Forces.
Mozambique, another recipient of Cuban military assistance,
is also a potential burden for Havana, since the Maputo
government is being seriously challenged by an insurgency
supported by neighboring South Africa.
When one considers all of the large-scale military
operations in which Cuba is presently involved, the
prospects of new Cuban interventions in the Third World
appear greatly diminished. Besides the obvious costs and
hardships involved in these efforts, Havana is also
increasingly concerned by a more self-confident United
States. The loss of Grenada in 1983 was a major blow to
Cuban foreign policy, in that it exposed Cuba's inability to
come to the aid of one of its client states. This lesson
was not lost on other Cuban supported regimes in Africa and
the Caribbean Basin, specifically Surinam, which quickly
expelled all Cuban advisors following the events in Grenada.
Cuba's past successes in military adventures in Africa,
Latin America and the Middle East were contingent on many
variables working in Havana's favor. The most important of
these variables were, and still are: 1) the objective
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conditions within the target country; 2) the readiness of
the Soviet Union to support Cuban military interventions
with substantial political, economic and military resources;
and (3) the inability or unwillingness of the United
States, or its allies, to challenge Havana politically or
militarily. For Havana, none of these variables appear very
promising in the late-1980s. Cuba's limited success in
Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua was the result of unique
internal and external circumstances. Today, all of the
above countries are beset by insurgencies, poor economic
performance and diplomatic isolation. To the Soviets, the
above countries (including the PDRY) have proven to be
expensive embarrassments rather than models of Marxism-
Leninism in the Third World.
Under Gorbachev the Kremlin has shown little interest in
"expanding" the Soviet empire in the same manner as the
Brezhnev regime did during the 1970s. To the present Soviet
leadership, the excessive economic and political costs
implied in such an effort far outweigh whatever political
and strategic gains that may result from such ventures.
Nicaragua may be an exception, because of its small
size, strategic importance, and the relative low cost of the
program when compared to Angola or Ethiopia. At a time when
the Soviets are trying to reform their own depressed
economy, the thought of acquiring new destitute nations in
the Third World (which may defect to the West the way Egypt
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did in the early 1970s) can hardly be an attractive proposi-
tion to Kremlin strategic planners. According to the RAND
Corporation's Francis Fukayama:
In addition to the steadily increasing subsidy to Cuba
(currently estimated at $5 billion a year) , Soviet
activism in the late 1970s saddled Moscow with costly new
multibillion-dollar obligations to countries like Vietnam,
Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Angola. The total cost of the
Soviet empire rose, according to one recent calculation,
from an estimated range of $13.6 billion to $21.8 billion
in 1971, to between $35.9 billion and $46.5 billion in
1980. At the same time, the growth rate of the Soviet GNP
fell precipitously, due to a declining rate of growth in
labor productivity. [Ref. 72 :p. 718]
By analyzing the singular variable of arms transfers,
one understands just how costly Soviet activism in the Third
World was in the 1970s. Prior to the 1970s, Soviet arm.s
deliveries to the Third World were less than $1 billion per
year. From 1970 to 1978, the dollar amount has ranged
between $2 billion and $3.8 billion per year, making the
Soviets the second largest supplier of arms in the world
with approximately 30 percent of all transfers. [Ref. 73 :p.
75]
From 1973-1977, the Soviets exported $16.5 billion in
arms with 50 percent being sent to the Middle East from
1974-1978 (Syria, Iraq and Libya) . While the economic
motive may have prevailed concerning arms transfers to
wealthy Middle Eastern OPEC nations (including Algeria) , the
Soviets also supplied large quantities of weapons in the
1970s to sub-Saharan African nations. In 1974, the Soviets
shipped $90 million worth of arms to select clients in this
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region of Africa. By 1978, the amount of arms involved was
$1.2 billion. [Ref. 73:p. 75] Today, the major Soviet
recipients of weapons in Africa south of the Sahara are
Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique (the Soviet Union has Treaties
of Friendship and Cooperation with all three) , the Congo
Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria and Zambia
[Ref. 28:pp. 345-443].
In Asia, the Soviets must take the Chinese threat into
consideration when contemplating arms transfers. The major
recipients of Soviet arms in Asia remain North Korea,
Vietnam and to a lesser extent, Laos. Considering the
meager economic resources of these three countries, and the
quantity of weapons in their inventories, the costs to the
Soviets in supplying their Asian allies with advanced
weaponry must be staggering.
Another factor, besides cost, which has also soured
Soviet interest in building Marxist-Leninist regimes in the
Third World is the political underdevelopment of its client
states. Few of the Kremlin's Third World allies have proven
their ability to form stable governments. The bloody civil
war in the People's Democratic of Yemen (PDRY) during the
spring of 1986 confirmed the Kremlin's worst fears: not
only are these self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes
economically and politically underdeveloped, they are also
inherently unstable. The disappointment in the PDRY and a




likely had a profound effect on the direction of Soviet
foreign policy towards the Third World. The Soviets have
learned the hard way that their enormous expenditures of
economic and military aid in the Third World have not yet
provided them with either significant economic dividends, or
stable allies.
The Soviet outlook towards increased activism in the
Third World is beyond the scope of this paper, yet it seems
safe to assume that the Kremlin's interest in sponsoring
military interventions, with or without the Cubans, in
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, is at its
lowest point in many years. [Ref. 72:pp. 715-731]
Havana's opportunities for military interventions in the
Third World are not much brighter. Few situations exist
where the Cuban Expeditionary Forces could achieve a quick
and conclusive victory and not suffer severe political and
possibly military consequences. In Angola, in 1975, the
Cubans were able to intervene on behalf of their established
friends, the MPLA. Then the Cuban troops were seen as a
"liberating" force by most of the continent, especially
after the Cubans engaged the South African forces invading
from the south.
The Soviet-Cuban intervention into Ethiopia in 1977 was
also a unique case in that the Soviets and the Cubans
responded to Ethiopia's request for assistance only after
Somalia had invaded the Ogaden desert—which was recognized
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as an integral part of Ethiopia by most of Africa and the
world. One of the basic tenants of the Organization of
African Unity's (OAU) charter is that boundaries between
African states are sacrosanct. By responding to Ethiopia's
request to expel the Somali invaders, the Soviet and Cuban
forces were acting within the legal bounds of the OAU
charter. However, the provisions of the OAU can also apply
to Cuba and the Soviet Union. By responding to Ethiopia's
request, the Soviets and Cubans were also limiting their
future involvement in African conflicts to defensive
actions. Such limitations are not an ideal starting point
for Moscow and Havana if they are trying to expand their
influence in Africa by military means.
There is one country in Africa in which the OAU charter
would not apply, and therefore, cannot be discounted as a
possible target for Soviet-Cuban "cooperative intervention"
at a later date. The country is of course South Africa.
With decolonization in Africa complete, the Soviets and
Cubans would need to target a country outside of the
protective framework of the OAU. South Africa has long been
a pariah state of not only Africa, but of the entire world.
Should the internal situation deteriorate to the point of
open civil war, the Soviets and Cubans could intervene with
little chance of armed opposition by Western nations. With
over 30,000 Cuban soldiers already in neighboring Angola,
and another 1,000 in Mozambique, the Cubans have the
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necessary infrastructure already in place should they, and
the Soviets, decide to act. A decisive military interven-
tion into South Africa to "liberate" that country from
imperialism and racism would significantly boost Soviet-
Cuban prestige in the Third World.
The prospects for further Soviet-Cuban gains in Central
America have also diminished over the past five years. With
the elections of civilian presidents in Guatemala, Honduras,
and El Salvador, the guerrilla option has become less
attractive to a majority of Central Americans. In
Nicaragua, the Sandinistas are on the defensive both
militarily and politically, making Cuban efforts to
discredit Washington's Central American policy even more
difficult. For Havana, Central America has proven to be a
much more difficult area to spread revolution than
previously thought following the Sandinistas' victory in
1979. The Cubans have become more aware of their limita-
tions: they are no longer able to inspire revolution in the
Third World, but can only facilitate it if the objective
conditions already exist.
What will Havana's strategy be until, when, and if the
above conditions shift back into Cuba's favor? Will Cuba
abandon its efforts in the Caribbean Basin and Africa? This
is not likely given Havana's commitment towards spreading
violent revolution through armed struggle. It is conceiva-
ble that Castro will modify his tactics in Latin America.
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In the short run, Cuba can be expected to hold on to its
revolutionary gains in Nicaragua while it waits for the
objective conditions in the Caribbean Basin to change in
Havana's favor. Meanwhile, the Cubans will continue to
provide their Praetorian guard services for small pro-Soviet
regimes in the Third World. Havana may also expand its
military's mobile training team (MTT) service to recipients
of modern Soviet arms willing to reimburse Cuba for its
services. This would not only provide Cuba with desperately
needed hard currency, but would also assist the Soviets in
its arms sales to Third World clients. Likely recipients
for this service are OPEC members such as Libya, Iraq, and
Algeria, and possibly, important Soviet clients such as
Afghanistan, the PDRY, and Vietnam.
Cuba should be expected to continue its support for
guerrilla, terrorist and drug trafficking organizations in
the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere. Since the early days
of the Cuban Revolution, Cuba has assisted revolutionary
groups by supplying arms and training in limited quantities.
Following the Sandinista's rise to power in Nicaragua in
July of 1979, Cuba renewed its efforts to unite, train and
supply guerrilla groups in El Salvador, Honduras and Guate-
mala. These groups have achieved some success, and are far
from being completely destroyed by government forces. Yet
the Cuban supported insurgencies in Central America are on
the defensive and unlikely to achieve victory in the next
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few years. The Cubans are aware of this fact and have, as a
result, limited their assistance to these groups for
practical and strategic reasons.
The third factor which determines the prospects of Cuban
intervention in the Third World is the willingness of the
United States and its allies to confront Soviet-Cuban inter-
ventions. This variable is the hardest to assess.
Washington's policy toward Cuba has been anything but
consistent. The Carter Administration's efforts to entice
Havana into pursuing a more moderate foreign policy in the
1970s was answered by massive Cuban military interventions
in Angola and Ethiopia. The Reagan Administration's policy
of confronting Havana's efforts (in El Salvador, Grenada and
Nicaragua) has made Castro more cautious, but has not solved
the overall problem of an aggressive and hostile power 90
miles off of the U.S.'s southern shore. Edward Gonzalez, a
consultant for the Rand Corporation on Cuban affairs and
U.S. policy, has suggested a policy which combines the two
approaches. He calls it the "Finlandization" approach which
limits Castro's options to those which do not jeopardize
United States' interests in the Caribbean region, but which
allows Cuba to maintain a foreign policy independent of
Washington. Gonzalez believes that this can only be
achieved by a combination of economic and political
incentives (carrots), counterbalanced by U.S. military
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pressure, and if necessary military action (sticks) , should
Castro threaten U.S. interests. [Ref. 14]
In the next decade, with Havana's options decreasing,
Washington's actions will have a profound effect on the
direction of Cuban foreign policy. It is crucial for the
United States to follow a policy which will influence Havana
to take a non-militant direction in its foreign policy.
While Fidel Castro is a relatively young leader and appears
in robust health, the United States should begin to plan its
strategy for a post-Castro Cuba. Whenever Castro departs
Cuba's political scene, a more imaginative United States
approach to the Cuban problem may be politically possible.
Discounting Castro's death or ouster in the near future,
what do all of these above developments mean for the direc-
tion of Cuban foreign policy in the next ten years? Will
Castro abandon Cuba's revolutionary zeal in an attempt to
improve relations with its neighbors? Can Cuba alter its
course after a quarter-century of revolutionary commitment?
Today, Cuba's options are probably more limited than at any
other time of its revolutionary history. Cuba's continued
poor economic performance has made Castro's Cuba a ward of
the Soviet Union and CEMA. Twenty-eight years following
Castro's rise to power, Cuba's major assets remain its
strategic location and capability to export revolution. In
a recent article, W. Raymond Duncun describes the current
Soviet-Cuban relationship in the following terms:
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Despite serious disagreements, both countries continue to
perceive the benefits of close collaboration as outweigh-
ing the costs. For Castro, the benefits derive from
Soviet assistance essential for maintaining Cuba's economy
and defense. Hence he is likely to continue accommodating
the Soviet line, but only so long as it does not threaten
his leadership of the Cuban party and his general standing
among Third World revolutionaries, especially in Central
and South America. For the Soviets, Cuba's strategic geo-
political position is the main asset. There are also past
investments to protect and Moscow's reputation as the
"natural ally" of the Third World to safeguard. Even if
Gorbachev's emphasis is on cost-effectiveness in domestic
and foreign policies, the Soviet leader will probably
still consider Cuba a useful investment as Moscow
continues to compete with the United States. [Ref. 46 :p.
56]
Whether the Soviets, and their Cuban allies, will
attempt a militant foreign policy in the Third World in the
next few years will depend on Moscow's evaluation of the
international political climate, the objective conditions of
the target region, and the available equipment and manpower
resources of the Soviets and their allies— including the
Cubans. While Castro's resources to conduct major
operations without the support of the Soviet Union remains
limited, it must not be discounted. Castro has surprised
his adversaries and allies in the past, and may attempt to
do so again in the future. Castro is most likely to act if
he feels that Moscow is abandoning Cuban interests in the
Caribbean Basin in favor of improved Soviet-U.S. relations.
Jaime Suchlicki has noticed that:
Castro's political style and ideology make him more prone
to deviate to the left than to the right of the Soviet
line, which means that if the Soviets urge restraints, he
might either maintain his position or shift to a more
radical approach. [Ref. 74 :p. 29]
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In the past chapters, we have seen the strengths and
weaknesses of Cuba's ability to support armed revolution.
No one is more aware of these limitations and assets than
Fidel Castro and the core of the Cuban government. There-
fore we can expect the Cuban government to continue with the
revolutionary system it has institutionalized since the
1970s with certain modifications. Castro has always shown
the ability to maintain his revolutionary credentials by
building alliances with nations or groups which share his
goals. The Soviet Union, while the longest and most impor-
tant Cuban ally, is only one of Havana's supporters. Since
the early 1960s, Castro has also worked with international
terrorist groups, regional guerrilla fronts, Vietnam, North
Korea, radical Middle Eastern regimes, and any other regime
or organization willing to support Havana's revolutionary
agenda. The United States must be prepared if Castro
decides to search out unlikely allies in an attempt to
revitalize Cuba's revolutionary credentials. The South
African scenario has already been mentioned, but there are
other powerful revolutionary forces in the world that are
more dangerous for United States' security, such as terror-
ism in support of Palestinian nationalism and Islamic funda-
mentalism. Already we have seen signs of Cuban cooperation
with Qhadaffi's Libya and possibly with the Ayatollah
Khomeini's Iran [Ref. 75].
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In summary, Castro's priorities for the duration of the
1980s most likely will remain as follows. First, protection
of revolutionary gains. In both Africa and Latin America,
Cuba has invested an enormous amount of resources, manpower
and prestige. A reverse in any of these countries,
specifically Angola, Ethiopia, or Nicaragua, would be a
serious blow to Havana's credibility as a revolutionary
power. This is especially true following the loss of
Grenada. Second, await new opportunities for military
operations in the Third World. While no major overt action
by the Cubans is likely to take place until the objective
conditions for intervention and revolution improve, that
does not mean that the Cuban regime's revolutionary foreign
policy will go into hibernation until these changes take
place. Cuba will continue to sponsor terrorism and
guerrilla warfare in the Caribbean Basin. Castro's target
countries in the region can still be destabilized as long as
the United States' Central American policy continues to
waver. Many of these regimes have only recently become
"democratic," and are therefore weak and vulnerable. By
encouraging a breakdown of authority in these countries,
Castro can hasten the return of military dictatorships, and
thus create the proper objective conditions for Cuban-
sponsored subversion and intervention. Should the
democratic reforms in many of these countries stagnate, the
guerrilla alternative will again become attractive. Third,
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sharpen Cuba's military skills through low-cost military
training missions in Africa, the Middle East, and Nicaragua.
The use of small conflicts or training missions maintains
Cuba's combat edge while increasing its prestige and pool of
future allies. This is mandatory for future Cuban military
interventions if and when the conditions for such actions
reappear.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Since the Cuban challenge to United States' security
interests is unlikely to recede or disappear over the next
decade, further research into the Cuban interventionary
threat will be required. We should expect Cuba • s military,
paramilitary, intelligence and logistical ability to improve
and expand into the 1990s. Therefore, it is mandatory that
the United States improve its long-range intelligence
collection and analysis effort in the Caribbean region, in
order to monitor future Cuban developments. Such an under-
taking could prove invaluable as the Soviet-Cuban presence
expands in the Caribbean Basin.
This thesis has tried to demonstrate that the Cuban
challenge to Western security interests depends on a combi-
nation of internal and external factors. Among the most
important of these factors are:
1) The composition of the Cuban decision-making process
(specifically the Politburo and Central Committee of
the Cuban Communist Party) . Changes in important
positions in the FAR, the Ministry of the Interior,
and other top security-related positions is also an
important indicator of the direction of Cuban foreign
policy.
2) The Cuban-Soviet relationship. Specifically, Moscow's
ability and willingness to subsidize the Cuban economy
and support Cuba's foreign policy with the necessary
military and economic resources. (Soviet arms
supplied to Nicaragua and Grenada, via Cuba, is an
example of the military support, while the Nicaraguan
and Grenadian multi-million dollar airports and public
works projects are perfect examples of the latter.)
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3) The professionalization, expansion, and modernization
of the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR), and of Havana's
intelligence services. While the combined Soviet-
Cuban effort to transform the Cuban military and
security services into the second most powerful
military power in the Caribbean Basin has been
remarkable, the FAR and DGI will continue to need more
modern equipment and training to maintain their profi-
ciency. This will require that both Moscow and Havana
continue to divert valuable resources to these organi-
zations, and provide advanced training, in order to
maintain their combat readiness.
4) The state of Cuba's relations with the United States,
Western Europe, and other non-socialist nations in the
Third World. Cuba's ability to expand its influence
in the Third World, specifically the Western Hemis-
phere, depends a great deal on Havana not provoking
the United States or isolating itself from other Third
World nations. Should Castro transcend the limits of
Washington's tolerance, Cuban forces or Cuba itself
may become the target of military reprisals by the
United States. Castro's foreign policy cannot afford
another Grenada-type failure, especially in Nicarag-
ua. Castro is aware of this and has tried to improve
relations with the United States, and other Latin
American nations. With a number of Latin American
nations turning towards the democratic alternative,
Cuba cannot be seen as an enemy of democracy. Castro
has publicly supported these new democracies while
privately he sees them as a barrier to his ambitions
in the region. Good relations with Western Europe are
also important for Cuban foreign policy. Western
Europe is an important trading partner with Cuba, and
a major source of hard currency. Cuba can therefore
ill afford to jeopardize this relationship.
5) The Cuban economy must improve its performance and
efficiency if it is to survive. There are limits to
the amount of economic aid the Soviets are willing to
provide Havana. The Gorbachev regime has already put
the Cubans on notice that unless they are able to get
their economic house in order, Moscow may freeze
economic aid at current levels. Castro has taken
action by instituting a number of Gorbachev-type
reforms and firing top economic planners for past
failures. At first glance it appears that the techno-
crats (pragmatists) are regaining power in the Cuban
government, while at the same time these gains have
been more than offset by Castro's dramatic recentrali-
zation effort over the past two years. [Ref. 52 :p.
118]
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since we are not privy to the notes and discussions of
the Soviet and Cuban Politburos, we must use alternate
methods of analysis to understand how each of these nations
develop their foreign policies and strategies, and implement
these policies. We are especially concerned with the use of
military missions overseas, or power projections, to achieve
foreign policy goals. Future research on the Cuban threat
should therefore deal with the above five factors. Despite
the fact that Cuba is a closed society, the West does
receive pieces of information which indicates the direction
of Cuban foreign policy, and the extent of Soviet-Cuban
cooperation during any given period. The most reliable
sources of information on Cuban intentions tend to be the
following: 1) announcements of top Cuban officials being
fired or promoted; 2) themes of Castro's recent public
speeches; and 3) the presence, or absence, of top Soviet or
Cuban officials at each other's major political events.
An example of this was Cuban displeasure with current
Soviet economic policy towards Cuba and strategy differences
regarding Nicaragua. Castro was furious when Moscow
threatened to freeze Soviet aid to Cuba at current levels
unless Havana put its economic house in order. In March
1984, Castro was again annoyed by the Soviets when the
Kremlin refused to let a Soviet naval flotilla make a port
visit in Nicaragua after a Soviet tanker had been seriously
damaged by a U.S. mine in Puerto Sandino. Castro wanted the
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Soviets to go ahead with the port visit to show Moscow's
military resolve for the Sandinista government. As a result
of these differences, Castro refused to attend the June 1984
CEMA summit meeting and the funeral of Mikhail Gorbachev's
predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko in 1985. The Kremlin
responded by sending a low-level Soviet delegation to Cuba's
26th of July celebration in 1984. [Ref. 46:p. 49]
The final source of information useful in determining
Soviet-Cuban relations and the direction of Cuban foreign
policy is the amount, and quality, of Soviet economic and
military assistance to Cuba. The above four sources of
information are critical in analyzing the five factors of
Cuban policies mentioned earlier. This section will now
recommend how these sources of information can be used to
determine the state and direction of the necessary factors
for Cuba's interventionary policy.
First, the composition of the Cuban decision-making
process. We have learned that the institutionalized Cuba
Government of the 1980s is composed of the fidelistas,
raulistas, and pragmatists. Since the mid-1970s, almost 80%
of the top positions in the Cuban Politburo, Central Commit-
tee, and the Communist Party (PCC) have been controlled by a
combination of fidelistas and raulistas. Both of these
factions support an aggressive, revolutionary foreign
policy. Over the past year, Fidel Castro has fired many of
his top administrators, Politburo members, and loyal
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followers since the early days of the revolutionary struggle
against Batista. Among the victims of the bloodless purges
have been the former minister of the interior, Ramiro
Valdes, the former minister of transportation, Garcia Frias,
the former health minister, Sergio del Valle, and Jesus
Montane, a long-time revolutionary leader (although his
replacement was believed to have been for health reasons)
.
These dismissals in the Politburo came after the firing of
11 top Cuban officials in 1985, most of whom were involved
in economic management [Ref. 46:pp. 52-53]. The exact
reasons for these purges, and whether it indicates a
realignment of power between the three bureaucratic factions
in the Cuban Government is still unclear. It is critical
that these developments be followed closely, for they may
indicate a fundamental change in the composition of the top
levels of the Cuban Government, and a redirection for
Havana's foreign policy agenda.
The second factor to be studied is the nature of the
Soviet-Cuban relationship. This requires an understanding
of both Cuban and Soviet politics and decision-making.
Should Moscow find Cuba's policy of exporting revolution to
be both too expensive economically and too dangerous
politically, it is likely that the Soviets will apply the
necessary economic and political pressure to force Havana to
desist. The Gorbachev Regime, besides emphasizing economic
performance at home, has shown, much to Castro's chagrin.
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more interest in East-West strategic matters than in North-
South issues. Missing from recent Gorbachev speeches are
references to national liberation movements in Africa, the
Middle East, or Latin America. Instead of promising Soviet
political, economic, and military aid to assist the enslaved
masses of the Third World gain their freedom from imperial-
ism (common during the Brezhnev years), today's Kremlin
leadership has recently described their commitment to the
Third World in far less grandiose terms. Both Mikhail
Gorbachev and his predecessor, Yuri Andropov have described
the Soviets program to the Third World as one of "profound
sympathy for the aspirations of peoples under the heavy and
demeaning yoke of colonialism." [Ref. 72 :p. 715] Castro's
concern that the Soviets might neglect Third World issues
(the linchpin of Cuban foreign policy) was evident when he
spoke in February of this year to the 27th Party Congress of
the Soviet Union. According to W. Raymond Duncan, Castro
reminded his Soviet audience:
. . . that national liberation struggles in "Vietnam,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Angola, Namibia, South Africa,
Western Sahara, Palestine, Afghanistan, and Kampuchea"
were not fought without great costs. He argued that "the
fruit of the blood and lives of many of the best sons of
our peoples" should not be reduced in world affairs to
"so-called low-level conflicts." [Ref. 46:p. 54]
Whether or not Castro is able to convince the Soviets of
the need to support Cuba's Third World revolutionary program
is yet to be seen. It is known that Soviet support is
crucial if Cuban revolutionary programs in the Third World
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are to succeed in the long run. Castro can assist small
terrorist groups and guerrilla organizations, but these
organizations will never be able to achieve or maintain
power without substantial military and economic aid from the
East bloc. If the Soviets are swayed by Havana as to the
utility of Cuban assisted revolution, it remains to be seen
what resources Moscow is willing or able to provide to
support such a program. Without substantial economic and
military support for Cuban interventions in the Third World,
these efforts are doomed to fail much like similar Cuban
efforts in the 1960s. The United States has been able to
measure accurately Soviet military and economic assistance
to Havana since the Cuban Missile Crisis. A precipitous
drop in Soviet shipments to Havana could signify serious
tension between Moscow and Havana, while an increase in
economic and military aid could mean the opposite. Re-
transfer of this aid, by Cuba, to a third country such as
Nicaragua, would likely mean Soviet agreement with Cuba's
regional policies.
The development of the Cuban Armed Forces should be of
critical concern to the United States. While the FAR and
the Cuban intelligence services are easily the second most
powerful force in the Caribbean (after the United States)
,
they will require further deliveries of advanced Soviet
military hardware in order to maintain their fighting edge
and expand their range. In the first five years of this
169
decade, the Cuban army, navy and air force received more
Soviet military hardware than at any time since the 1962
missile crisis (see Figure 6) . The more lethal equipment
supplied by Moscow to Havana included: three new-
construction diesel-powered submarines, two large frigates,
two amphibious landing ships, a few batteries of SA-6
surface-to-air missiles, and over 30 MIG-23 fighter-bombers.
On the other hand, many of the ships, aircraft, and tanks
supplied by the Soviets to Cuba in the 1960s and early 1970s
will soon become obsolete (see Appendix D) . Should the
Soviets continued to supply Havana with numerous advanced
weapons, Cuba's ability to threaten the Caribbean sealanes
will increase drastically over the next decade. However,
should the Soviets slow down the transfer of modern arms to
Cuba, the FAR's capability would slowly deteriorate. It is
therefore critical that the United States carefully monitor
Soviet arms transfers to Cuba. Castro also needs large
shipments of less-sophisticated Soviet weapons to replace
arms his regime transfers to guerrilla groups and friendly
revolutionary governments. Further research should indicate
where, how many, and what kind of weapons the Soviets are
shipping to the Third World. Appendix B provides the reader
with an understanding of where, in the Third World, Soviet
weapons have been sent in the past, and the compatibility of
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Defense, The Soviet-Cuban Connection in
Central America and the Caribbean , p. 9,
March 1985
Figure 6. Soviet Arms Deliveries to Cuba 1970-1984
(in thousands of metric tons)
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The direction of Cuba's diplomatic and economic
relations with the United States, Western Europe, and other
non-socialist countries in the Third World will also be a
major factor in the direction of Havana's revolutionary
policy. Cuba must avoid provoking Washington to the point
that the United States responds militarily. The Western
Europeans, besides the economic assistance they provide to
the Cuban economy, are powerful allies in preventing
Washington from taking military action against either
Nicaragua or Cuba. An aggressive Cuban foreign policy may
convince the Western Europeans to side with the United
States in the Caribbean Basin under the banner of NATO
unity.
Cuba must also improve its image in the Third World.
Cuba's prestige in the Third World has suffered greatly
following Havana's support for the Soviet Union's invasion
" of Afghanistan in 1979. Diplomatic relations between Cuba
and a number of countries in the Caribbean Basin, especially
the English-speaking countries, have remained strained in
the aftermath of Grenada. Colombia severed relations with
Havana in 1981, after evidence of Cuban-sponsored terrorism
became irrefutable. Castro cannot afford to be isolated
again in the Western Hemisphere as he was in the 1960s.
This has created a tremendous dilemma for the Cuban
leadership. Prudence dictates that Havana should tone down
its revolutionary operations in order to improve relations
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with other nations in the Hemisphere. At the same time,
Castro feels these operations should be expanded to
revitalize Cuba's revolutionary credentials, and justify the
sacrifices he has demanded of the Cuban people.
Recently, Cuba has made some inroads in improving
diplomatic relations with a number of Latin American
countries. Cuba reopened diplomatic relations with Brazil
and Uruguay in 1985-86. In the case of Brazil, this
occurred after nearly a 22 year hiatus. Ecuador's conserva-
tive president, Leon Febres Cordero, visited Havana in 1985,
thus becoming the first Latin American head of state to do
so since 1960. [Ref. 52:p. 130] Havana's relations with
Panama and Mexico remain good, much to Washington's
displeasure. Cuba's diplomatic relations with other nations
in the world should be followed closely, since it is an
indicator of what policies the Cubans are likely to follow.
Finally, the most difficult problem for the Cuban regime
will likely be continued poor economic performance. While
Castro has tried everything from material to moral incen-
tives, the Cuban economy has shown few signs of improving.
The Soviets and other CMEA members are becoming increasingly
worried by the burdens of subsidizing the Cuban economy.
However, there have been no signs of the Soviets reducing
their support for the Cuban economy. On the contrary, the
Cuban Press reported in April of 1986 that Ivan Arkhipov,
Soviet First Deputy Premier, signed four trade and economic
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agreements totaling approximately $3 billion in new credits.
This would represent a 50% increase in Soviet economic aid
to Cuba over the 1986-90 five year period [Ref. 46:p. 57].
clearly, the Cuban-soviet economic relationship remains
strong. Cuba, as the largest recipient of Soviet aid in the
Third World, is one of Moscow's "few super-clients."
Havana's future position as one of Moscow's super-clients
will depend on Cuba's ability and willingness to actively
support Soviet foreign policy objectives. In return for
this generous aid, the Soviets may call on Cuba to perform
missions ranging from intelligence operations against the
United States, NATO members, and select targets in the
developing world, to full-scale military interventions in
support of other Soviet clients. If the Soviets are
unwilling to conduct an aggressive foreign policy in the
late 1980s, as they did during the 1970s, it is likely that
the Kremlin will demand Cuban assistance on the other end of
the warfare spectrum, specifically espionage and influence
operations. Either way, the Cubans have the necessary
resources, experience, and most importantly, the willingness
to perform whatever mission is necessary, along as it coin-
cides with their own strategic interests.
For its part, Cuba must also be reevaluating its situa-
tion. In the early 1970s Cuba decided to build up its
military forces and security services at the expense of
economic programs. The value of this large military
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bureaucracy may be limited, and possibly a liability, if the
Soviets are unable or unwilling to finance Cuba's economy at
home along with its military adventures abroad.
In conclusion, the Cuban revolution is at a critical
point of its development. The analogy of the Cuban Revolu-
tion in the 1980s and mainland China in the 1970s is
thought-provoking and deserves further analysis. Most
Cubans have lived through an extended period of revolution-
ary fervor and Marxist-Leninist indoctrination. On the
economic front, Cuba has tried nearly all the "quick-fix"
development programs attempted by Bejing including breaking
with capitalist trading partners, moral incentives and
Havana's version of the "great leap forward" (the 1970 goal
of a ten million ton sugar harvest), all to no avail. Cuba
is still dependent on sugar, which it is now producing at
three times the world price. Havana's membership in COMECON
prevents it from any drastic departures from its present
trading policy, and many Cubans are resigned to a lower
standard of living for many years to come. Jorge Dominguez
has noticed a drastic shift by Castro back to the failed
economic policies of the 1960s. That is, rather than
decentralizing the Cuban economy, Castro has reimposed his
authority in several areas. Small market-related incentive
programs, which were successful in the 197 0s, have been
outlawed and replaced by moral incentives. Rather than
"bending" the stiffling tenets of Marxism-Leninism, Castro
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has reemphasized the correct "ideological" route in building
socialism. [Ref. 52:p. 118]
Should these policies fail in the 1980s, as they did in
the 1960s, the Castro Regime could face serious challenges
to its continued rule in Cuba by more pragmatic members of
the PCC. Washington should prepare for such a development
in order to be in position to exploit it should it ever
occur. Havana, like Bejing, may one day be willing to try a
new development strategy, a strategy which is less threaten-
ing to the interests of the United States and Cuba's other
Caribbean neighbors. Should Fidel Castro be overthrown, the
Cuban Revolution could attempt a radically different foreign
policy similar to that of the Chinese after the death of
Mao. However, since such a shift would be a great victory
for U.S. strategic security, and the worst defeat for Soviet
foreign policy in a quarter-century, it is the most unlikely
outcome. The Soviets have most certainly developed contin-
gencies for a post-Castro Cuba. Soviet influence pervades
virtually every sector of Cuban society, especially the
economy, military, and security services. It is conceivable
that Moscow has already chosen Castro's successor (either
Raul Castro or a revolutionary junta made up of pro-Soviet
raulistas and pragmatists) . Such a development would bring
Cuba and Havana's foreign policy more in line with that of
other Warsaw Pact surrogates of the Soviet Union. Given
Castro's sometimes irrational behavior in the past, the
176
"Bulgarianization" of Cuba has most likely been Moscow's
goal for the past twenty-seven years. If such a scenario
does come to pass, we should expect a raulista-ruled Cuba to
continue its revolutionary activities around the world, but
with foreign policy goals and strategies even more closely
parallel to those of Moscow.
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APPENDIX A
CUBAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION ABROAD
COUNTRY
DATE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
















































































































































































































































































































































SDAR is the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic also known as
the Polisario Front. This group has been fighting Morocco
since 1976 for its independence.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directory of
Officials of the Republic of Cuba
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COMPATIBILITY OF CUBAN WEAPONS VJITH
OTHER SOVIET THIRD WORLD CLIENTS
TABLE 12
MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO OTHER SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN THE THIRD WORLD
CUBAN
INVICN'TORY
TYHK, OK ANGOLA ETHIOPIA NICAR. PERU MOZAMB. PDRY LIBYA IRAQ CONGO
EQUIPMENT
ARMY
T-3i (325) 175 iO - -
T-54/55 (350) 200 300 120 250
T-62 (160) 90 30 - -
PT-7t) (55) 50 - JO -
BRDM-I/-2(75) 200 150 50
BMP 1 (50) - 40 - -
BTR -40/-60/
-152 (500) 225 600 172
FROG -5/-7(65) - _ _ _
NAVT
FOXTROT (3) - - - -
YKVCKNYA ( 10) - - 2
OS A 1/11(18)6 4
POLNOCNY (2) 3 2 - -
Zllillk (25) 1 2 3 -
AIR FORCE
MIi; J3/27(51) 25 35 - -
MIG 21 ( 184) 70 100 *
MtC 1 7 ( 15) 20 1(1
L-39fSUMK) - 10 t>
XLIN 326(30) -
MI-8 HIP (40) 40 32 12 5




SA-2 (2B) - IS - -
SA-3 (9J 40 18 - P
SA-6 (12) 72
ZSU-23-4 20 P - 23
P/PLN - Present /Present in Large Numbers
- Included in Above Total
* . On Order
195 P - - P
90 450 2.500 2.900 35
. . 250 3
30 P 200 P 25
- 100 700 500 -
200 300 900 PLN 74




_ 8 12 10 -
_ 3 3 3 -
5 2 - P "
175 48 .
_ 48 55 200 -




- 100 20 4
30 ISQ 60 _
R 15 30 45 -
4 3 5 2 -
- 9 13 - -
_ 54 72 120 -




- P '450 PLN -
Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986
183
TABLE 13
MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN ir^T/ENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
CUBA
TYPE OF ALGERIA SYRIA PDRY LIBYA IRAQ
F.UUIPMENT
ARMY
T-34 (325) - - P - -
T-54/55 (350) 300 1 ,800 450 -.500 :.9oo
T-62 (160) 300 1 .300
PT-76 (55) - - - - 250
BRDM-l/-2(75) 150 800 P 200 P
BMP 1 (50) 650 600 100 700 500
BTR -A0/-60/
-152 (500) 5 50 1 .600 300 900 PLN
FROG -5/-7(65) - 18 12 48 14
NAVY
FOXTROT (3) - -• - 6 -
YEVGENYA (10) - 1 - - 3
OSA I/II ( 18) 11 12 8 12 10
POLNOCNY (2) 1 2 3 3 3
ZHUK (25) - 6 2 ~ P
AIR FORCE
MIG 23/27 (51) 62 120 - 175 48
MIG 21 (184) 95 180 48 55 200
MIG 17 (15) 80 85 30 - -
L-39 (SOME) - 90 - 100 20
MI-8 HIP (40) 35 125 30 ISQ 60
MI-24 HIND( 18) 35 40 15 30 45
AN 24/26 (25) - 11 3 5 *-
IL-76 (1) _ 4 9 13 -




SA-6 (12) 18 PLN P 350
ZSU-23-4 130 PEN P 450 PLN
P/PLN - Presenc/Pr esen t in 1.arge Nuniber 9
'




Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986
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TABLE 14
MAJOR SOVIET ARMS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN ASIA
CUBA (NUMBER)
TYPE OF VIETNAM NORTH KOREA
EUIUPMENT
ARMY
r-3-i (325) 1 .6')0 300
T-5^/5S (3 5,0) • l.'iOO
T-o2 U60) ' *
PT-7b (55) 450 -
BRn-i-i ;-:( 75) p _
BMP '50) 1 ,500 .
llfK -40/-6()/




FOXTROT (3) - _
YEVGENYA (10) - _
OSA I/II (18) a 10
FOI.NOCNY (2) 4 _
XIIUK (25) 7 -
AIR FORCE
Mil, 23/27(51 ) - 4*
1IG 2 1 (184) 225 160
M I G 17 (15) - 280
L-39(S0ME) P _
ZMN 326(30) - -
MI-8 HIP (in) 3h 20
MI-24 IIINU(18) 30 _
AN 24/26 (25) 62 10
IL-76 (1) -
SA-2 (28) 60 45
SA-3 (9) * _









P/PLN " Present/Present ]n Large Numbers
- Included in Above Total
*
- More On Order
Soruce: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986
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TABLE 15
MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN AFRICA AND ASIA










NONE •^ WIIISKKV i,< 20 S'J-7
3 SHERSHEN FAG 160 MIG-19
NONE b PFiYA FFL 45 SU-20/-22




NONE NONE 2 MI-6
NONE i SHERSHEN FAC 5 SU-22*
2 FOLUCMAT
NONE 2 PETYA FFL 10 AN-12
NONE I POLilCHAI 1 TlJ-13a
NONE 1 SHERSHEN NONE
Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986
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TABLE 16
MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED






ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE
100 BMH-1 1 ROf'UCHA LST 25 SU-20/-22
6 SCUD B
100 T-72 •> PETYA FFL IS SU-7
603 BMF-1 1 T-43 MSF 40 Si:-20
18 SCUD B 2 VANVA MSC 30 MIG-25
18 SS-21 4 NASUCHKA II* 10 MIG-25R
? SA-8 7 MIG-23G





300 T-72 4 NANUCHKA II 9 TU-22 BLINDER
? SCUD B 7 NAT^A MSF 50 MIG-25





100 T-72 2 R-CLASS SS 20 SU-7
650 BMP-1 4 NANUCHKA 18 SU-20








? T-72 7 POLUCHAT 7 TU-22
















Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986
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TABLE 17
MAJOR SOVIET ARMS NOT IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY TRANSFERRED
TO SOVIET CLIENT STATES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE
GRENADA




NONE NONE 48 SU-22
Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance 1972-1986
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APPENDIX C
CHARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND
GROUND WEAPONS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY
TABLE 18
CPiARACTERISTICS OF MAJOR SOVIET GROUND AND AIR
WEAPONS IN THE CUBAN INVENTORY




T-i4/55 l<1hl 100 mm 14,300
T-()2 1902 1 1 5 mm 13 ,800
PT-7b l')52 7b """ 1.200
BMP 1*^66 73 mm 24.000
BTR 1959-1965 K.5 MG 23,000
BRDM 1 1960 1A.5 MG
BRDM 2 1965 1A.5 MG
FROG 1963 35 NM RANGE 700
SA-3 1964
SA-6 1967 875
ZSU-23-4 1966 4/23ram 2,000
AIR FORCE
KIKST COMBATKAUIUb MAX SPEED ARMAMENT * IN SOVIET
DEPLOYED (S. MILES) (MACH) INVENTORY
MK; -3 1972 7i)0 2.3 Gl'N/AAM 2,510
MIG 21 1950 500 2.1 Gl'N/AAM 720-
MIC 17 I ''5 3 2 2") SUBSONIC (il'NS/AAM
Mr-8llir I'Jhl 120 loo MPH GI!NSH1PS 120
Ml-24 HIND 1973 100 200 MPH CLViHIPS 830
AN 24/26 1,295 245 MPII POSS ROCKETS ?
Source: John M. Collins, U.S. -Soviet Military
Balance 1980-1985 , Pergamon-Brassey
,
London, 1985, pp. 209-221
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APPENDIX D
TYPES OF SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA (1960-1985)
TABLE 19
SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA DURING THE
PRE-INTERVENTIONARY PERIOD (1960-1971)
ARMOR TANKS (T-34, JS-2 , T-54, PT-76);
APCs (BTR 40, 60, 152)




























Source: IISS, and Jean Labayle Couhat, Editor,
Combat Fleets of the World 1984/85
.
Naval Institute Press, 1984
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TABLE 2
SOVIET WEAPON SYSTEMS TRANSFERRED TO CUBA DURING THE
INTERVENTIONARY PERIOD (1972-1985)
ARMOR TANKS (T-55 AND T-62)
;
ARCS (BMP, BRDM SCOUT CARS and ZSU-2 3/4)
AIRCRAFT (MIG-23, AN-24/26, IL-62 , TU-154 , MI-8 , -14, and
MI-24)
NAVAL UNITS
YEAR DATE OF SOVIE
# UNIT BUILT TRANSFER INVENT
2 SONYA MSF 1973- 1980 (2) (35)
10 YEVGENYA
MSC 1969- 1978-83 (36)
6 OSA I PTG 1960-65 1972-74 (70)
INSHORE MSC
1 DISCARDED
13 OSA II PTG 1965-70










CLASS FF 1976 1981/84 (1+) NEW
CONSTRUCTION
2 POLNOCNY-




PATROL 1976- 1975-83 (30)
Source: IISS, and Jean Labayle Couhat, Editor,
Combat Fleets of the World 1984/85 .
Naval Institute Press, 1984
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